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ABSTRACT 
EXPLORATION OF THE CURRENT STATE AND DIRECTIONS OF DYNAMIC 
RIDSHAREING  
by Joseph J. Di Gianni  
Dynamic ridesharing (DRS) is an emerging transportation service based on the 
traditional concept of shared rides.  DRS makes use of web-based real-time technologies 
to match drivers with riders.  Enabling technologies include software platforms that 
operate on mobile communication devices and contain location-aware capabilities 
including Global Positioning Systems (Agatz, Erera, Savelsberg, & Wang, 2012). The 
platforms are designed to provide ride-matching services via smartphone applications 
differing from early systems that used non-real time services such as internet forums, or 
telecommunications, where responses were not immediate.  
The study of DRS is important when considering its role as an emerging 
transportation demand management strategy.  DRS reduces travel demand on single-
occupancy vehicles (SOVs) by filling vehicle seats that are typically left vacant.  The 
most recent statistics of vehicle occupancy rates were measured in 2009 by the National 
Household Travel Survey (NHTS), conducted by the U.S. Department of Transportation.  
According to the NHTS, the 2009 occupancy rate for all purposes was a meager 1.67 
persons per vehicle (Federal Highway Administration, 2015). Vehicle occupancy rates 
examined against the total of all registered highway vehicles in the U.S. as of 2012, 
calculated at 253,639,386 (Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2015), reveals the 
magnitude of the impact of SOVs.  Left unattended, the ramifications for environmental 
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outcomes is substantial.  Among the major energy  consuming sectors, transportation's 
share is largest in terms of total CO2 emissions at 32.9% (Davis, Diegel, & Boundy, 
2014, p. 11-15).  
DRS offers promise to fill empty vehicle seats.  Evidence indicates that specific 
demographic subgroups are inclined to use DRS services. For example, data suggest that 
the subgroup of 18 to 34-year-olds, the so-called "millennials", have negative attitudes 
towards private car ownership unlike previous age groups (Nelson, 2013). Data collected 
for this study revealed that the millennial subgroup represents half of all DRS users. 
Millennials also revealed they tended to use DRS more than other subgroups to replace a 
private vehicle.  Further research is needed to determine if the trend towards DRS by 18 
to 34-year-olds represents current economic factors or a fundamental cultural shift away 
from the SOV transportation model.    
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CHAPTER 1 
1. Introduction 
Each day in North America fixed capacity roads become filled with cars, trucks, 
and buses as demand volumes rise with resultant slower speeds and frequently stopped 
traffic.  At the same time, unused capacity remains idle in the form of unoccupied seats in 
millions of passenger cars. Utilizing those empty seats can contribute to reducing vehicle 
emissions, lowering fuel usage, and creating socioeconomic opportunities from 
productivity gained through the efficient use of the transportation system.   Currently, 
carpooling is the primary method used to fill empty seats in private vehicles (NHTS, 
2009). Major barriers to greater adoption of carpooling, however, have kept its 
contribution to the overall transportation matrix at low levels (Chan & Shaheen, 2012). 
Major barriers include issues of private space, conflicting schedules, increased travel time 
allotted for pick-up and drop-off of passengers, and safety risks to both persons and 
property (Ferguson, 1997). Despite these barriers carpooling takes place as evidenced by 
recent U.S. Census data indicating that twice as many people use carpooling in a private 
vehicle to commute to work than those who use public transportation (Davis, Diegel, & 
Boundy , pp. 8-20, 2013).  With the relative success of carpooling in mind, this study 
aims to examine a form of trip sharing  known as dynamic ridesharing (DRS) which 
promises to overcome barriers to carpooling and increase the number of occupied seats 
utilized in private vehicles.                 
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DRS is an emerging automated process facilitated by an online provider that 
matches drivers with riders in real-time (Agatz, Erera, Savelsberg, & Wang, 2012). The 
matching provider, generally a software company, uses information, communication, and 
location-aware technologies in the form of Internet-enabled smartphones and social 
media websites such as Facebook to match riders with drivers in real-time usually within 
minutes before the trip takes place (Agatz, et. al, 2012). These enabling technologies are 
at the heart of renewed interest in DRS, also known as real-time ridesharing. Software 
companies facilitating DRS are the newest innovation being considered by consumers 
and are emerging quickly driven by rapidly changing enabling technologies (Deakin, 
Frick, & Shivley, 2011). Hence, transportation planners are re-examining DRS's potential 
benefits to reduce traffic congestion and automotive emissions despite an overall 10% 
decline in the rate of carpooling within the last 30 years (Table 1) (Furuhata, Dessouky, 
Ordóñez, Brunet, Wang, & Koenig, 2013). Currently, the modal share for carpooling in 
Canada and the U.S. is approximately 8 to 11%, respectively (Chan & Shaheen, 2012).  
Table 2.1: Transportation to Work 1980-2011: Drove alone vs. car pooled and 
transit 
Means of Transportation to Work, 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2011 
 1980 Census 1990 Census 2000 Census 2011 ACS 
Means of 
transportation 
Number of  
workers 
Number of 
workers 
Number of 
workers 
Number of 
workers 
1,000s Share 1,000s Share 1,000s Share 1,000s Share 
Private vehicle 81,258 84.1% 99,593 86.5% 112,736 87.9% 120,316 86.3% 
Drove alone 62,193 64.4% 84,215 73.2% 97,102 75.7% 106,139 76.1% 
Car pooled 19,065 19.7% 15,378 13.4% 15,635 12.2% 14,177 10.2% 
Public transport 6,175 6.4% 6.070 5.3% 6,068 4.7% 6,914 5.0% 
 
Sources: Davis, et al, 2013, p. 8-20. 
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1.1 Distinguishing dynamic ridesharing services from non-dynamic services.  
DRS differs from regular ridesharing, also known as carpooling, in that it is an ad-
hoc service arranging single shared rides on short notice (Amey, Attanucci, & Mishalani, 
2011). Regular ridesharing has had a primarily temporal dependence on commuting 
where participants agree to a recurring long-term schedule of planned shared rides.  
Regular ridesharing, or carpooling, may be organized by an employer or governmental 
agency who supply a match-list for participants to arrange rides with common origins and 
destinations.  This can be done in some conventional ways such providing lists of 
potential participants on a website with contact information or government sponsored call 
centers initiating matches via telephone.  Informal carpooling can also be initiated by co-
workers making arrangements for rides based on current mutual needs.  In the 1990s, 
carpooling was also a component of the Clean Air Act of 1990 that was intended to 
reduce vehicle air emissions.   
There is another variation of informal carpooling known as casual carpooling or 
slugging, which is an ad-hoc form of rideshare initiated by commuters at Park and Rides 
or large employment centers such as the Pentagon in the northern Virginia suburbs of 
Washington, DC. Slugging is motivated by a commuter's incentive to use the faster 
moving High Occupancy Vehicle lanes or to reduce daily costs of tolls and fuel. Slugging 
is effective in reducing the number of vehicles per lane during peak demand periods (Ma 
& Wolfson, 2013).  Slugging differs from DRS in that the participants meet in-person and 
make informal arrangements for fuel and toll payments. 
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  Finally, DRS should not be confused with car-sharing organizations that provide 
members access to shared vehicles via a reservation system similar to the car rental 
company model (Shaheen, Cohen, & Chung, 2009).  Car-sharing companies like Zipcar 
and Hertz on Demand differ from dynamic ridesharing in that users are committed to a 
specific rental period, and it does not discouraged single-occupancy vehicle (SOV) use 
(Figure 1.1).  Car-sharing has had some success as Cervero, Golub, and Nee (2007)  
noted, that 30 percent of households participating in a car-sharing program either avoided 
or postponed car ownership and used other modes more often such as transit, bicycling, 
and walking. 
 
Figure 1.1: Zipcar, a subsidiary of Avis Car Rental Company, is a car-sharing 
company that allows members to pay a fee for access to various vehicles, depending 
on the driver's needs. (Source: John DiGianni) 
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1.2 Background  
Carpooling has been part of the transportation planner's  toolbox since the mid-
twentieth century, however, it has received new attention due to a convergence with 
advanced information and communication technologies (ICTs) over the last two decades 
(Siddiqi & Buliung, 2013). High-speed broad band access to the Internet offering real-
time delivery of information over location-aware mobile devices are the enabling factors 
that are defining DRS as a new paradigm for sustainable transportation. A paradigm shift 
can be seen in the roles of the different stakeholders who are creating a convergence 
between ICTs, automobile manufacturers, and software developers along with end user 
confidence all of which are leading to the current proliferation of  DRS providers (Siddiqi 
& Buliung, 2013).  Automobile companies have already indicated the potential economic 
harm that DRS presents to the industry. However, some companies such as Daimler have 
been very supportive of DRS research (Ecosummit TV, 2014).  
DRS is linked to carpooling in that it matches drivers with riders while reducing 
the use of single-occupant vehicles (SOVs). In a DRS scenario, however, non-recurring 
trips are arranged between participants in real-time using an Android or Apple 
smartphone (Figure 1.2) or social media website such as Facebook  (Figure 1.3) on a per-
trip basis (Levofsky & Greenberg, 2001). Both riders and drivers must be registered with 
a matching provider via a software  application on their smartphone or through a social 
media website.  When a request for a ride is made a database is searched for potential 
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drivers and riders using high-dimensional matching that analyzes multiple  parameters 
such as proximity, pricing, and trust and reputation systems (Furuhata, et al., 2013).   
  
Figure 1.2: Left, Android 4.3 home screen. Right, Apple iOS7 home screen. (Source: 
Author) 
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The ICT convergence has enabled much of the recent success of DRS, however,  
lingering challenges regarding personal safety have also been addressed.   For example, 
the use of trust and reputation systems, another unique feature of DRS is similar to user 
rating systems employed by online retailers eBay and Amazon. In a DRS arranged ride, 
trust and reputation systems are used by both the driver and the rider who must rate the 
experience at the end of the transaction (Furuhata, et al., 2013).  Other layers of added 
security include mandatory criminal and motor vehicle background checking conducted 
by the match provider that solves some of the traditional carpooling resistance that riders 
have to sharing trips with strangers.  Furthermore, match providers make available 
liability insurance to lessen participant anxiety over any legal issues that might arise in 
the event of an accident (Figure 1.4). 
Figure 1.3 : Facebook webpage for a DRS service.( Source: Lyft, 2014) 
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Figure 1.4: Insurance policy infographic (screen capture) for DRS provider Lyft. 
(Source: Lyft, 2014) 
It has become increasingly difficult to ignore the transportation sector's 
contribution to Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions, lost economic productivity due to 
traffic congestion, and dependency on imported oil. Despite public policy promoting 
mass transit and traditional carpooling most programs have failed to achieve a substantial 
modal share especially in low-density automobile-oriented urban areas (Levofsy & 
Greenberg, 2001).  Among the major energy consuming sectors, transportation's share of 
total CO2 emissions is largest at 31.7% (Table 1.2) (Davis, et al., pp. 11-5, 2013).  
Strategies to reduce transportation's emissions are most often focused on regulating travel 
demand which at a rudimentary level are the decisions made regarding when and how to 
reach places such as centers of employment, entertainment, etc. (Cervero & Kockelman, 
1997). 
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Table 1.2: Transportation's share of total GHG emissions. 
 
Total U.S. Greenhouse Emissions by End-Use Sector, 2011 
(million metric tons carbon dioxide equivalent) 
 
     
  Carbon dioxide Methane Nitrous oxide 
Hydrofluro-carbons, 
perfluro-carbons, 
sulfur hexafluoride 
Total 
greenhouse 
gas 
emissions 
Residential 
      
1,131.8  
            
3.7  
            
9.2  
                     
25.2  1,169.9 
Commercial 
         
966.2  
         
121.9  
           
13.5  
                     
29.4  1,131.0 
Agricultural 
         
123.7  
         
210.6  
         
278.1  
                       
0.2  612.6 
Industrial 
      
1,575.2  
         
249.6  
           
39.1  
                     
33.3  1,897.2 
Transportation 
      
1,758.3  
            
1.4  
           
16.9  
                     
57.1  1,833.7 
Transportation share of total 31.7% 0.2% 4.7% 39.3% 27.6% 
Total greenhouse gas emissions 
      
5,555.2  
         
587.2  
         
356.8  
                   
145.2  6,644.4 
Source: Davis, et al, 2013, p. 11-5. 
Transportation demand management (TDM) policies in the U.S. have traditionally 
involved strategies aimed at reducing such demand by inducing drivers to shift  from 
SOVs  to high-occupancy modes such as carpooling and mass transit (Black & Schreffler, 
2010). Other recent strategies have included bike-sharing, such as the Citi Bike program, 
a privately managed public bicycle sharing program in New York (Citi Bike, 2015) 
(Figure 1.5).  Citi Bike users purchase passes from a street pay station that deducts fees 
electronically based on the period of use.  
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DRS in practice reduces the number of vehicles per lane of roadway, thus it 
qualifies as a TDM strategy aimed at reducing oil dependency, consumption, and traffic 
congestion. All are promising goals. However, the degree of these benefits is still unclear 
and requires further research (Chan & Shaheen, 2012).  
    
Figure 1.5: A Citi Bike station in Manhattan. (Source: John DiGianni)   
Saddiqi and Buliung (2013) examined the historical progress of DRS  from a 
technological perspective highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of ICTs from the 
period of the 1970s oil crises which relied on early Bulletin Board Systems then available 
only at universities and large governmental agencies, into the present mass adoption of 
smartphones beginning in the late 2000s with devices like the Blackberry, iPhone, and 
Android. Surveys such as those conducted by Buliung, Bui, & Lanyon (2012)  have 
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shown that the temporal regularity of commuting, i.e. journey-to-work, is influential in 
the successful formation of carpooling programs. It is often the work commute that 
receives the most focus for this very reason, however, recent evidence suggests that the 
highest person miles of travel (PMT) have shifted from commuting to personal trips, e.g. 
shopping, visiting, entertainment, etc. (NHTS, 2009).  While there has been much 
research on commuting and carpooling, there has been relatively little empirical research 
on DRS other than anecdotal evidence suggesting it often used outside of the work trip.    
Chan & Shaheen (2012) provided a synopsis of ridesharing's history divided into 
five key phases: (1) World War II car-sharing clubs intended to conserve resources, e.g. 
rubber, fuel, steel, etc.  (1942-45); (2) reactions to geopolitical events involving the 
manipulation of oil markets, i.e. OPEC oil embargo, (1970s to 1980); (3) early employer-
based ridesharing schemes focused on air quality and traffic reduction that relied on 
telephone-based matching and employer incentives (1980-1997); (4) reliable ridesharing 
systems that used early ICTs to provide matching services typically via websites or 
traveler telephone information services, e.g. 511 phone travel information service (1999-
2004); (5) Internet-enabled and location-aware real-time ridesharing based on incentives 
held out by sustainable urban transportation initiatives (2004 to present). 
From this overview one sees that ridesharing plays an important role in addressing 
societal issues. Hence it is important to seize on the current renewed interest in the topic 
for further study.  To date, there has been little agreement on what constitutes an effective 
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DRS program.  The chief aim of this study is to identify the benefits and motivating 
factors that attract users and, more importantly, characteristics for early adopters of DRS. 
1.3 How dynamic ridesharing works- a primer.  
Both drivers and passengers may initiate  DRS by signing in through their 
Facebook account or by downloading an application to their smartphone.  Either of the 
above access methods creates an account providing an interface where users post their 
availability as drivers or passengers.  In the case of drivers, the availability of seats in his 
or her vehicle is posted along with a face picture and information identifying the vehicle 
(e.g., a full image and license plate number).   Riders open the application on their 
smartphones and  begin keying in a request for a vehicle via the software's interface.  
Global Positioning Systems (GPS) built into the hardware and software of the 
smartphone make the device location-aware, thus enabling real-time matching of 
participants based on their proximity to each other.  At this point, the service attempts to 
match the rider to an available driver using an algorithm that accounts for distance and 
time to the pick-up and drop-off points.  The passenger sees on his or her smartphone 
screen an estimated pick-up time as well as the fare for the ride. Payment is not handled 
in-person but is processed through the smartphone's software application that contains the 
passenger's credit card information. At the completion of the trip, the application requests 
the passenger to provide a rating of the driver and overall service.  Likewise, the driver is 
also given an opportunity to rate the passenger on his or her device.  A payment for 
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service is deducted from the rider's credit card with generally 80% of the fare going to the 
driver and 20% to the matching provider (Lyft, 2014). 
1.4 Tying dynamic ridesharing to Environmental Management 
The present transportation system's capacity is not being utilized efficiently.  The 
phrase "transportation system" can mean many things, e.g. roads for private vehicles, 
public transport vehicles (buses, vans, jitneys), heavy commuter rail, urban metros, 
ferries, lanes and infrastructure dedicated bicycles, and more.    
According to the U.S. Census Bureau's five year estimate (2009 to 2013), 106.7 
million workers drove alone to work in a car, truck, or van (U.S. Census, 2015). 
Assuming the average vehicle holds 5 passengers, these workers took with them the 
potential to transport, 426.9 million people in their vehicle's empty seats.  That's more 
than the estimated 2015 U.S. population of 320 million people. 
Seats that can be filled reduce road capacity, an environmentally beneficial 
condition that can lead to: reduced traffic congestion, reduction of transportation sector's 
impact on the environment, free flowing roadways without further need for infrastructure 
investments, and increased work productivity.        
1.5 Research Objectives 
The overall structure of the study will take the form of four chapters, including 
this introduction,  with the chief aim of contributing new research for the  transportation 
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planning profession's understanding of DRS as a TDM method to reduce SOV use.  This 
study will examine three key research objectives: 
1. Exploration and assessment of  the directions that DRS has taken, and its 
potential as a disrupting innovation to change the current urban 
transportation system both nationally and globally. 
2. A demographic examination of a sample of U.S. DRS users to understand 
who are the early adopter consumers of DRS.     
3. A qualitative assessment of leading DRS services in two premier cities, 
San Francisco and New York, to compare and contrast issues. A 
chronology of legal and administrative issues was used to determine the 
similarities and difference of DRS development in each city.    
Each research objectives will be explained in detail in the remainder of this section. 
1.6 Organization of Thesis 
Chapter 2.  The objective of the first study examined the current state and direction of 
DRS.  The study introduces DRS in a historical context. DRS is explained within the 
present-day context of SOV-driven automobility. Early car-sharing programs are 
described, and then compared and contrasted with DRS to learn similarities and 
differences. A history and description of DRS follows, with an explanation of how it 
breaks with traditional transportation management strategies.  The break with 
transportation planning is witness by the convergence of DRS ICT. In the past, 
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transportation engineers and planners formulated solutions to mobility problems within 
their specific disciplines. DRS represents a break with that model.  
The first study is titled "Explorations of the Current State and Directions in the 
Emerging Field of Dynamic Ridesharing Platforms". The study was submitted and 
published in the Middle States Geographer, Volume 47, 2014. The Middle States 
Geographer is an official published journal of the Middle States Division of the 
Association of American Geographers.      
Chapter 3.  The objective of the second study will be to explore the demographic 
characteristics of the users of DRS. The approach to empirical research adopted for this 
study will be quantitative based on a structured survey administered over the Internet to a 
target audience of dynamic rideshare users. See the Appendix A for a reproduction of the 
survey approved by the Montclair State University Institutional Research Board. The 
target audience was a sample of 300 participants with a balance of male/female 
responses.  An online survey was administered, by SurveyMonkey, an Internet platform 
that provides audiences and analysis of responses (SurveyMonkey, 2015). The 
respondents were randomly chosen from all regions of the United States.  Descriptive 
statistics were used to explore user-driven motivations to use DRS, which was aimed at  
providing opportunities for system improvements and expansion (Zmud & Rojo, 2013).  
 Technology-enabled DRS  is the newest emerging innovation being adopted by 
consumers, however little known about this evolving transportation mode.  By examining 
a segment of the population who have adopted DRS, we hope to understand if the new 
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technology can provide alternatives to the  predicament of SOV use.   The purpose of this 
study was to describe who the users of DRS are in urban areas and explain how they 
came to choose this mode over other more established modes.  The study was largely 
descriptive in nature. 
Chapter 4.  The third research objective of this study will be a qualitative assessment of 
the features  of DRS in urban areas in order to compare and contrast features of each 
application on the current market. DRS companies are emerging quickly driven by 
technology that we have not had time to assess. Despite recent success, questions have 
been raised about the viability of DRS in many cities due to economic and political push-
back from traditional transportation companies such as taxis and airport limousine 
services. Progressive states such as California have already made legal rulings on DRS 
services and have giving them the name transportation network companies (TNCs) to 
distinguish them from traditional transportation providers (Public Utilities Commission 
of the State of California, 2012). A comparative study will be based on how each of the 
leading DRS services address key issues such as optimization methods, pricing of 
service, minimizing costs, maximizing passengers served, and most importantly their 
success or failure at meeting legal challenges from traditional transportation companies 
as well as challenges from state and local governments who are motivated to protect the 
status quo .  
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CHAPTER 2 
Exploration of the Current State and Directions in the Emerging Field of Dynamic 
Ridesharing Platforms 
[This chapter was published in the journal Middle States Geographer, Volume 47, 2014] 
 
Abstract 
Automobility has advanced since the postwar decline of public transportation and 
its near universal replacement by single-occupant vehicles (SOVs) throughout much of 
the developed economies. Even so-called “transit friendly” economies of the Global 
South have seen shifts in their modes of transportation to systems that are predominantly 
SOV-based (Cervero, 2013).  Intensive infrastructure expansion within emerging 
economies indicates that the SOV is being adopted at a rate similar to the developed 
economies of one hundred years ago. Henry Ford's quote “With mobility comes freedom 
and progress” points to the concept that mobility becomes universally interpreted as 
“automobility”. Grave concern is linked to the continuation of the SOV model and its 
consequences for an environment taxed by an ever-expanding transportation sector. A 
paradigm shift, however, in the SOV-driven model, has been detected coming not from 
transportation but the different domains of information and communication technologies. 
This review examined the current state and direction of dynamic ridesharing 
(DRS), an emerging technology driven by recent technology innovations over the last 
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two decades (Siddiqi & Buliung, 2013). DRS matches drivers and riders in real-time 
using Internet and mobile technology, and are single-occurrence events organized on 
short notice (Amey, Attanucci, & Mishalani, 2011). We include a case study of DRS 
from its roots in San Francisco, CA. The city provides a present-day template for 
emerging themes when DRS is introduced into the present-day urban transportation 
system. 
Keywords: dynamic ridesharing, mobile communications, Uber, Lyft, SideCar, taxis 
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2. Introduction 
Apart from safety and amenity advancements, little has changed in personal 
mobility since the public transportation network was rendered secondary by postwar 
business interests. Much of that network became universally replaced with single 
occupancy vehicles (SOVs) (Snell,1995). Automobility focused on technological 
advancements in amenities, fuel economy, and safety improvements and has been 
pervasive even within the so-called "transit friendly" developing countries of the Global 
South (Cervero, 2013). Intensive highway infrastructure expansion among the rising 
economies has signaled their intention to replicate the developed world's SOV model 
based on Henry Ford's motto “With mobility comes freedom and progress". 
The year 2015 marks the 70th anniversary of a period of vast economic and social 
upheaval following World War Two. Change was stimulated by the mass migration of 
middle-income families from the central cities to the less expensive land of the suburbs 
and concomitant monumental investments in infrastructure and highways.  During the 
automobility era, private vehicle ownership has been encouraged and welcomed as a 
facilitator of opportunities for those once confined to housing within walking distance to 
the nearest transit stop (Liepmann, 1944). This freedom has come at a cost in terms of 
global environmental climate change enabled partly by rising vehicle emissions, 
squandered resources, and productivity lost to SOVs idling in traffic. Among the major 
energy consuming sectors, transportation's share of total CO2 emissions is largest at 
32.9% (Davis, Diegel, & Boundy, 2014, p. 11-15).  
 The information and communication revolution in technology has changed many 
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aspects of society, particularly in the retail and financial sectors. Information technology 
has been slow in adapting to transportation systems. The arrival of Big Data, the massive 
volume of both structured and unstructured information collected by ubiquitous sensors 
as well as social media websites and global-positioning-system-enabled (GPS) mobile 
devices, has at last come to transportation (Miller, 2013). A paradigm shift in 
automobility in the developed and developing economies is still in its initial stages, but it 
is rapidly altering common perceptions of private vehicle ownership and use.  
A major activity behind this paradigm shift is a variant of carpooling known as 
dynamic ridesharing (DRS). DRS is an emerging method of personal mobility based on 
the traditional concept of ridesharing. DRS matches drivers with riders in real-time using 
online technology platforms (Agatz, Erera, Savelsberg, & Wang, 2012). The platforms 
provide matching services via smartphone applications that use information, 
communication, and location-aware technologies to match drivers with riders in real-
time. Drivers do not work for a technology company providing matching services, but are 
instead independent contractors providing their vehicles to transport passengers 
(Hubpages, 2014). The DRS platforms also offer a method of payment using a 
smartphone, and in most cases peripheral services such as liability insurance and 
background investigation of drivers (made available to quell concerns about personal 
safety). The DRS companies earn income using a business model based on transactions 
called an administrative fee that is typically 20% of the charge for the ride (Hubpages, 
2014).  The remaining 80 %of the fare is deposited electronically in a bank account 
designated by the driver.  The DRS platform sets the charge for the ride based on factors 
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such as distance and whether the ride occurs during peak or off-peak hours.   
 DRS differs from traditional ridesharing since matches between drivers and riders 
are arranged in real-time using mobile technology, are single-occurrence events and 
organized on short notice usually within minutes before a ride (Amey, Attanucci, & 
Mishalani, 2011). Traditional ridesharing, such as carpools and pre-arranged shared 
vehicles, continue to be part of the transportation planner's toolbox. However, the toolbox 
has expanded with recent advancements in information and telecommunication 
technologies (ICT) that have allowed the evolution of DRS (Figure 2.1). DRS represents 
a break with tradition in its lack of connection to the major regulation, transportation 
planning, or engineering disciplines. Contemporary transportation demand management 
(TDM) strategies designed to reduce traffic demand and SOV usage were policies 
developed by transportation professionals such as traffic engineers and transportation 
planner. DRS has similarly desired outcomes; however, it was conceived out of the 
entirely different domain of information technology.  
 
Figure 2.1: The evolution of ridesharing. 
 
DRS proliferation has followed a predictable pattern established in San Francisco, 
CA, its city of origination. That pattern is one of a disruptive innovation (Christensen, 
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2003), occupying the newer value network of smartphone users, and ever poised to 
invade the older value network of the taxi and limousine industry. Consequently, DRS 
has pushed hard on the older taxi and limousine industry to the point where competitors 
are attempting to fend off market erosion with similar technology with hopes of surviving 
the current disruption (Christensen, 2003).  Renewed interest in the concept of 
ridesharing must be understood not as a sustaining innovation but as disruptive, with 
potential to change all existing for-hire car markets. DRS focuses on the convergence 
between information and communication technologies, GPS-enabled internet and mobile 
devices (i.e., smartphones), and represents a new paradigm in transportation planning 
(Siddiqi & Buliung, 2013). 
2.1 Background 
This review examined the emerging themes and changing aspects of the new DRS 
technology into the classic urban transportation system. It focused on the current state of 
the top three DRS platforms: UberX, Lyft, and SideCar. The platforms are the companies 
creating the software that operates on smartphones and websites, and allows drivers and 
riders to be matched in real-time. San Francisco was chosen as a case study because it the 
origination point of ICT-enabled DRS and can be used to explore general directions that 
DRS services take once they enter a market. San Francisco possessed a unique history 
regarding the traditional taxi industry. Despite its unique underlying history, San 
Francisco provides a basic formula for DRS adoption in cities across the world.  On a 
rudimentary level, each DRS platform offers a service matching riders with drivers using 
similar software and hardware. Additionally, each DRS service has similar policies for 
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transaction processing, providing automobile insurance, and plans for future expansion. 
Variation occurs where each platform offers its own distinct brand of ridesharing that is 
often reflected in the social media of individual offerings. Although there is an apparent 
variation among cities and DRS platforms, there is a demonstrable pattern of DRS 
adoption that follows the San Francisco case history.  
 The technology companies responsible for the development of smartphone 
applications are at the heart of DRS. The leading platforms,  UberX, Lyft, and SideCar, 
each represents a prominent position in the current state of DRS. Uber is the largest 
service offering the most choices in ridesharing spanning from luxury livery vehicles to 
basic sedans. In all cases vehicles are driver-owned independent contractors who set their 
own work schedules. Lyft is the next largest platform the primary competitor of Uber. In 
order to compete directly with Uber, Lyft has been branching into specialty services such 
as Lyft SUV, a service that provides larger vehicles, and Lyft Line, a service that uses a 
program to match multiple riders in a single vehicle along an optimized route (Lyft, 
2015).  In third position, SideCar competes by offering fares lower than the two giants. 
The DRS transport mode is developing quickly due to competition among the platforms 
and the rapidly changing nature of enabling technologies. Hence, any thorough 
cataloging of DRS platforms at this time will likely result in an outdated list (Deakin, 
Frick, & Shivley, 2011). 
2.2 The Dynamic Ridesharing Platforms 
The sphere of DRS platforms is comprised  of startups that have risen and fallen 
quickly due to the rapidly evolving nature of their technology. Additionally, the nascent 
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business model of DRS is still unrecognized by many regulators at state and municipal 
levels. (Begley, 2014).  Additional background on Uber, the parent of UberX was 
provided to give context.  Background was also provided for Zimride, the earlier iteration 
of  Lyft.  The following sections give a brief overview of the histories and business 
models of the prominent platforms, Uber/UberX, Lyft, and SideCar, as of 2015. 
2.2.1 Uber and UberX                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
The breakthrough enabling technology needed to make ridesharing real-time 
would be wedded to DRS at the 2008 Le Web Conference in Paris, a venue for European 
entrepreneurs.  Startup technologists Garret Camp and Travis Kalanick, met at the 
conference and formed what was to become Uber, the present day behemoth of DRS 
platforms. Both had recently completed start up deals and were reflecting on what could 
be the next major disruptive innovation from Silicon Valley. Camp had suggested dealing 
with the well-known problem of requesting a taxi in San Francisco. A victim of mid-
twentieth century deregulation and re-regulation, the taxi industry in San Francisco had 
become synonymous with some of the most unpleasant aspects of that  city's  life 
(Newsham, 2000).  Camp and Kalanick devised a program, initially for their exclusive 
use that would circumvent the taxi problem by using smartphones.  An app on the iPhone 
was developed to split the cost of a professional driver and a luxury black car to get 
around San Francisco on-demand (Arrington, 2010). Upon returning to San Francisco, 
the two began what could be called a "limo timeshare." They split the cost of a Mercedes 
S Class limousine, a driver, and parking space in a city garage.  Either could use the app 
on his iPhone to summon the shared-limo without resorting to taxis to get around San 
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Francisco. The developers soon realized that anyone with access to a smartphone and 
appropriate software could use such a system to circumvent the historical problem of 
getting around San Francisco by taxi. Hence, the final piece of the DRS puzzle, 
developing a mobile device app, was developed by Camp in March of 2009. At the same 
time, Kalanick prepared a prototype of the project that was tested in New York using 
several cars in January, 2010.  
Uber was officially launched as UberCab on May 31, 2010 on iPhone and 
Android mobile devices in San Francisco. At its inception, UberCab offered only full-size 
luxury vehicles based on the company’s original prototype that reflected private black 
luxury car services offered in Lower Manhattan. The name “UberCab” was shortly 
changed to “UberBlack” to conform to its black luxury car image. In December 2010, 
Kalanick became CEO of Uber (Uber Blog, 2010). The management change reflected a 
strategic transition from the successful launch to long term disruption strategy based on 
Kalanick’s philosophy of DRS-driven industry change. In 2012, Kalanick threatened 
industry disruption in the form a full attack on the local taxi and car-for-hire industry 
with the launch of UberX, the platform's program of smaller non-luxury privately owned 
vehicles driven by non-professional drivers, and at prices competitive with regular city 
taxis (Flegenheimer, 2014). As will be shown in the case of San Francisco, industry 
disruption can be positive and bring improvements to customers in a region where taxis 
service had become all but dysfunctional. The ease with which UberX had recruited 
drivers and immediately placed them on the street transporting passengers has been 
phenomenal and well documented.  The lack of traditional car-for-hire regulatory 
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restrictions has made UberX more accessible to both drivers and riders with its ease of 
driver enrollment and simplicity of passengers using smartphones to summon a ride. 
Unlike Uber Black, the smartphone application that summons a black luxury car at 
premium cost, UberX meets the more precise definition of DRS which is the short notice 
matching of riders and drivers in average,  privately owned vehicles. Hence, Kalanick's 
UberX model offered more potential to disrupt the taxi industry with its simplified model 
(Brustein, 2013). 
2.2.2 Lyft 
In 2007, Logan Green, a recent University of California, Santa Barbara graduate, 
developed a web-based DRS service called Zimride.com to make trips to see friends in 
California (Bell, 2007). The use of websites on the Internet to match riders with drivers 
was not new in 2007, dating back as far back as the 1990s (Dailey, Loseff, & Meyers, 
1999). A fundamental change came when Facebook released its  application 
programming interface (API) to third-party developers. Green used this opportunity to 
incorporate the trust and reputation capabilities of Facebook that would make ride-
matching closer to present-day DRS (Masabumi, et al. 2013).  Leveraging the social 
networking capabilities of the website Facebook added two elements that were missing 
from ride-matching: overcoming the initial fear of getting into a vehicle with a total 
stranger and creating the critical mass of users necessary to provide regular and complete 
round-trip service (Bell, 2007).  
Later in 2007, Green met John Zimmer, an analyst at Lehman Brothers in New 
York.  Zimmer’s graduate studies at Cornell University included transportation issues 
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with a particular emphasis on solving the problem of underutilized road capacity, 
estimated to be about 80%  daily.  Zimmer saw this as an opportunity to fill those empty 
seats and make efficient use of road capacity. By the time of Lyft’s launch in San 
Francisco during the summer of 2012, about 2000 seats per month were being filled on 
rides between San Francisco and Los Angeles for about $35.00 each way (Gustin, 2012). 
As CEO for Lyft, Zimmer has been instrumental in developing the platform’s core 
philosophies. These beliefs included using enabling technology to change structural 
inefficiencies in transportation (Gustin, 2012) and focus on community-building to bring 
people together (Olanoff, 2012). 
2.2.3 SideCar 
SideCar, a DRS platform launched in San Francisco in June 2012, is third ranked 
among the national platforms operating today.  Initially, SideCar differentiated itself in 
how it priced rides.  SideCar began an innovative policy where the passenger set the price 
of the ride, which the company called donations, rather than fares.  Instead of choosing a 
set price, the app asks the passenger to decide how much he/she feels the ride is worth. 
(Brustein, 2013). The passenger's price was honored as a valid fare regardless of whether 
it covered the cost of the driver's time and/or vehicle operation. The "donation" policy 
changed in 2013 and riders were required to pay minimum fares. This decision was made 
to compete with Uber and Lyft and encourage SideCar drivers to drive more regularly 
(Rodriguez, 2013).  Like the two larger platforms, SideCar incorporates trust and 
reputation systems that allow drivers and riders to rate each other. Trust and reputation 
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systems are an integral part of the sharing economy and in the case of DRS have a direct 
role in the operation of app-enabled ridesharing programs (Miller, 2013). 
2.3 Existential Issues Facing the DRS Platforms 
2.3.1 Insurance and DRS Platforms 
 Automobile insurance is handled similarly by each DRS service and is often a 
function of the state in which the platform operates.   Platforms claim their insurance 
packages cover occupants of vehicles and injuries to persons and property outside of 
vehicles in the event of an accident during the entire DRS process. Platform-paid 
coverage generally begins from the moment the app is opened until it is shut off.  
Specifics depend on the platform, the jurisdiction being served, and any DRS-specific 
regulation that has been put in place at the state or municipal level. For example, Lyft 
states in its insurance overview that a driver has contingent liability insurance while 
his/her smartphone app is on waiting for a ride match. During the time defined by the 
California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) as Period 1, up to $50,000 coverage per 
person is offered for bodily injury, up to $100,000 per accident for bodily injury, and up 
to  $25,000 per accident for property damage. In addition, Lyft offers excess liability and 
uninsured/underinsured motorist  coverage up to $1,000,000 per occurrence and 
contingent collision and comprehensive coverage of up to $50,000 per accident  with a 
deductible of $2,500 (Lyft, 2014). UberX offers coverage in most states at levels similar 
to taxis and limousines in the cities of those states (Uber Blog, 2014). Sidecar's driver 
liability for property damage and/or bodily injuries to passengers or third parties offers 
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coverage at $1,000,000 per occurrence and is similar to Lyft and UberX, however, 
additional coverage for the "app on" period is only offered for the state of Washington. 
The model of regulation that has been emulated by most DRS platforms is based 
on a decision made by the CPUC in San Francisco on September 2013 where the name 
Transportation Network Company (TNC) was created to define DRS platforms that used 
smartphones and Internet technology to match riders with drivers (California Public 
Utilities Commission, 2013) (Appendix B). The CPUC  also set mandatory rules on 
driver and criminal background searches for drivers registering with a TNC. Insurance 
was also made necessary by the CPUC, setting three "defined periods" to help clarify 
when insurance applies. Period One is  "App open-waiting for match"; the driver is in 
his/her  vehicle and turns on the app.  Period Two is "Match is accepted- but the 
passenger is not yet picked up"; the driver is on his/her way to retrieve the passenger.  
Period Three is "Passenger in the vehicle and until the passenger safely exits vehicle" 
(Table 2.1). The CPUC wanted to make sure there were no insurance gaps when drivers 
were getting paid to give rides and achieved this with the legislation passed (G. 
Mathieux, personal communication, October 9, 2014). 
Table 2.1: CPUC defined periods when TNC covers insurance. 
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Controversy still exists over TNCs and their role at airports. Despite a near 
universal laissez-faire acceptance of TNCs throughout California's cities and the rest of 
the United States, airports have stood vehemently opposed to TNC operations on airport 
property. Their hesitancy ostensibly stems from a concern about additional traffic 
congestion at airports. Some TNCs, such as Wingz, circumvent the airport issue since 
they do not use a smartphone app, but instead accept reservations for airport pickups and 
drop offs through their website only.  The CPUC and the City of San Francisco recognize 
that web-based companies such as Wingz historically had customers reserve rides via the 
web. Thus, they are exempt from the Period One and Period Two phases of insurance 
coverage.  The "hybrid" web-based TNCs are required to provide coverage for defined 
Period Three. Defined period three is when the passenger enters the vehicle and until 
he/she safely exits (G. Mathieux, personal communication, October 6, 2014). Discussions 
to allow TNCs at airports are ongoing.  
2.3.2 TNCs and the Taxi and Limousine Industry 
Another major issue affecting the viability of modern DRS platforms, including 
those operating as TNCs, is their mixed and often contentious reception by municipalities 
and the taxi and limousine industry.  When TNCs such as Uber, Lyft, and SideCar enter a 
market, municipalities find themselves in an awkward position of intermediary between 
the interests of influential labor and taxi industry lobbies and local citizens who see DRS 
as an environmentally progressive and cost effective alternative to the old taxi and 
limousine model. In most cases, the local taxi industry and its attendant labor groups 
resist the DRS platforms citing unfair advantage due to the lack of regulation. Some 
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municipalities have raised the issue to the state level requiring a degree of regulation 
from the DRS platforms by classifying them as TNCs. TNC regulation typically includes 
mandatory motor vehicle and criminal background checks on drivers, safety inspections 
of vehicles, and minimal commercial insurance coverage.   
DRS platforms operate in more than 90 cities in the United States.  Only seven 
states, Delaware, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, South Dakota, West Virginia, and 
Wyoming have not had a DRS platform enter any of their municipalities as of 2014. 
Noticeably absent from the list of DRS cities is Las Vegas, NV, a city whose taxi and 
limousine industry is unique. Taxi regulation in Las Vegas is by a state-appointed board 
of officials shielded from direct lobbying by the major TNCs (Shine, 2014). Las Vegas 
with its giant tourist industry, however, cannot be ignored, and how and if the TNCs 
manage a launch in this city can be another indication of how viable DRS is especially in 
cities that have strong political mechanisms in place to thwart acceptance .  
The question of DRS's viability, however, seems close to being answered 
affirmatively as unlike Las Vegas,  most municipalities have only been able to issue 
cease and desist orders to TNCs. Cease and desist orders are ignored summarily by the 
TNCs, who would rather pay fines than halt operations.  Another tactic used to halt or 
slow down TNC market entrance is quick and temporary legislation that is contingent on 
a final vote off in the future.  This approach often fails as well since in the interim TNCs 
have time to take their case to the public who is typically sympathetic. Hence, acceptance 
continues to evolve with all but eighteen states having some form of legislation pending 
(Jergler, 2014).   
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When a DRS platform enters a new market, it follows an established pattern based 
on its inception in San Francisco. At first there is intense interest by early adopters and 
the unemployed/underemployed who see a promising new transport mode and help to 
diffuse the innovation rapidly. The reaction of taxi and limousine companies to early 
DRS launches were initially benign. The newcomers were sometimes cast in the local 
press as outgrowths of the Great Recession of the late 2000s and its concomitant Sharing 
Economy (Fournier, et al., 2013). The DRS platforms' close association with technology 
was initially seen as a fad associated with young urban adults. With time and experience, 
however, taxi and limousine companies quickly learned that DRS platforms were well 
received by drivers and riders across the demographic spectrum. Current reaction to DRS 
arrival is now quite proactive usually beginning with press campaigns and appeals at the 
municipal level to reign in the unregulated competitors. Unfortunately, once the local 
citizens experience DRS it becomes difficult to reverse. The reason for this is the DRS 
platforms have been savvy in their use of promotions and media in inculcate themselves 
into the local culture. Also, allowing them to demonstrate their service has filled a void in 
many cities where clean, reliable, and pleasant taxi service has been missing. 
Municipalities try to reach consensus among the DRS platforms and its 
constituency made up of primary stakeholders such as local citizens, labor unions, and 
taxi and limousine companies. Additionally, depending on the municipality, taxi 
medallion owners are a vocal group who stand to lose significant income. Taxi 
medallions are government-controlled taxi permits that increase in value based on 
economic regulation such as limited supply for the entire city. The provision and value of 
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medallions become meaningless as the rate of DRS adoption increases (Badger, 2014).   
The concerns of medallion owners have yet to be resolved and promises to be a sticky 
future issue as it involves government taking or eminent domain arguments and possible 
compensation for the owners (PR Newswire, 2014). Further research into the status of 
medallions with regards to TNCs is required in order to find optimal solutions for this 
problem. 
Cities in the United States began regulating taxi companies in the 1920s in order 
to deal with the chaos of independent drivers, upgrading of safety standards, and 
reduction of discriminatory practices (Dempsey, 1996). Part of that regulation was the 
institution of the medallion system.  About fifty years later many taxi companies were 
deregulated along with other transport modes as per the business and ideological moods 
of that time. As will be shown in the case history of San Francisco, deregulation brought 
unsatisfactory results to most cities causing them to resume regulation or seek piecemeal 
fixes through ballot initiatives. 
2.4 Case Study: Dynamic Ridesharing in San Francisco 
San Francisco is often the starting point for a contemporary technology story (e.g. 
Apple, Hewlett Packard, Xerox, eBay, etc). Hence, it would seem logical to credit the site 
and situation characteristics of the San Francisco Bay Area with the origination and 
growth of DRS since it is one of the world’s preeminent research and development 
centers. Its proximity to major research universities and the technopole of Silicon Valley 
is credited with the origination of many elements of DRS technology. However, it will be 
shown that fundamental urban transportation issues lying outside San Francisco’s role as 
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technopole were in place several decades earlier (Castells, Hall, 1994).  Dysfunctional 
management of the region’s taxi industry forced innovation onto this, the first of the DRS 
cities. An environment for reform within the taxi industry was already in place before 
DRS arrived in the Bay Area. And when it did arrive its success was notable. San 
Franciscans tend to be early innovation adopters, and their adoption of DRS was no 
exception as it filled a need for service in a city notable for its poor deployment of taxis. 
To understand the origination of ICT-enabled DRS in the Bay area, reflection on the last 
35 years of attempted reform of the taxi industry in San Francisco will be instructive.  
2.4.1 Background 
 In 1978, perceptions of unfairness and corruption within the taxi industry of San 
Francisco led to ballot initiative Proposition K (Newsham, 2000).  Proposition K called 
for a system using taxi medallions as operating permits, to be issued by the City of San 
Francisco to persons paying an annual fee (San Francisco Municipal Transportation 
Agency, 2014). Persons possessing medallions are not a driver, but rather owners of 
medallions, who lease it to experienced taxi drivers in order to generate income.  Under 
Proposition K, the city placed a limit on the number of medallions it authorized. By 2009, 
the next year of significant regulatory reform, the limit on the number of medallions 
authorized was 1,500 for a city of more than 800,000 people. The 1,500 medallion-limit 
represented a gradual increase over several decades intended to keep pace with demand. 
Suppressing the medallion limit, however, proved to be one of the contributing factors in 
public complaints regarding the difficulty of ordering a taxi (Said, 2014). 
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The 1978 system was designed to prevent speculators from bidding up the price 
of permits by awarding medallions only to individuals who would rent taxis from 
established companies at a set fee per shift. However, after several decades it was 
apparent that this system was not optimal for deployment of taxis throughout the city   
(Newsham, 2000). An attempt to reform Proposition K led  to a successful 2007 vote on 
Proposition A giving the San Francisco Board of Supervisors the option of transferring 
regulatory jurisdiction from the Taxi Commission to the San Francisco Municipal 
Transportation Agency (SFMTA) (San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency, 
2014). In March, 2009, the Board of Supervisors exercised the option, and the SFMTA 
added the Taxi Commission to a consolidation with the San Francisco Municipal Railway 
and the Department of Parking and Traffic.  Proposition A's significance to the taxi 
industry was that by placing the Taxi Commission under the auspices of the SFMTA, 
reforming Proposition K could be realized.  The transfer of jurisdiction to the SFMTA 
also brought retirement and medical benefits to career taxi drivers. In the past, low 
incomes and meager benefits precluded a social safety net despite the many years of 
service per average driver (Lam, et al., 2006). 
Since 1978 taxi drivers have been operating as independent contractors of the 
established taxi companies, e.g. Yellow Cab.  Independent contractor status had worked 
to the benefit of the taxi companies that were insured income from the leasing of 
medallion-linked vehicles to drivers regardless of how often they were used during a 
shift.  Companies also benefitted from the independent contractor relationship with 
drivers having been relieved of paying disability and social security taxes as well as being 
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shielded from the threat of unionization (Newsham, 2000).  Many drivers approved of the  
independent contractor status seeing it as a benefit freeing them from direct supervision 
and granting the ability to set one's work schedule (Newsham, 2000).  
Unfortunately, passengers suffered most from this system. Upon examination of 
the 1978 and 2007 rules and regulation, passengers in San Francisco are never guaranteed 
service when they request a taxi. The entire system is skewed to the medallion and taxi 
company owners who earn set fees from drivers regardless of the hours and amount of 
passengers handled in a work shift. For example, when a request for a ride is transmitted 
to a particular taxi it is broadcast to all available drivers of that company, regardless of 
distance or whether their vehicle is occupied with a passenger. One hopes the request will 
be heard by drivers who are roaming and waiting for passengers. Ironically, this is the 
primary dysfunction of the system because drivers are operating independently and are 
under no obligation to accept a call for a ride. An available driver close by to the potential 
rider might be ending his/her shift and will opt to leave the request open where it may or 
may not be accepted by drivers who are farther away.  
Thus, passengers in San Francisco had been deprived of reliable taxi service for 
many decades despite attempted ballot initiatives that were really aimed at reforms 
designed to favor medallion and taxi company owners. Hence, the San Francisco taxi 
problem sets the stage for the DRS innovators  who understood the problem and applied 
the enabling technologies that would fill a void and bring reliable taxi service to 
passengers. 
2.4.2 The Launch and Operation of Dynamic Ridesharing in San Francisco 
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ICT-enabled DRS was launched first in San Francisco, a city in need of taxi 
reform and possessing the requisite engineering and financial talent requiring a successful 
operation. Both major DRS providers, Uber and Lyft, launched service in San Francisco 
at approximately the same time. Concurrent with the launches of Uber and an Lyft, San 
Francisco voters debated and eventually passed Proposition A, the law that would give 
the taxi industry yet another chance at reform. Ironically, as Proposition A was being 
voted into law a nascent DRS industry was beginning with a positive public reception. 
Other DRS services entered the San Francisco market encouraged by the success of Uber, 
Lyft, and SideCar.  
In the wake of the successful 2013 CPUC ruling in San Francisco, incidents have 
occurred which continue to test TNCs.  For example, a few months after the CPUC made 
carrying insurance mandatory for each DRS, a six-year-old girl was struck and killed at a 
San Francisco intersection by an UberX driver on the evening of December 31, 2013 
(Melendez, 2014).  The UberX driver had been picking up and dropping off passengers 
that evening using the UberX app on his smartphone. Under the CPUC ruling Uber must 
cover both the driver and his passengers with $1 million liability insurance, however, 
Uber contends that coverage is only in effect while drivers are transporting riders with the 
app on (Table 2.1). According to Uber, when the pedestrian was struck, the driver did not 
have a passenger in his car and was not on his way to pick up passengers, thus he was not 
providing services to Uber at the time of the accident (Melendez, 2013).  The case is still 
pending with both Uber and the driver fighting a wrongful death lawsuit filed against 
each of them (Williams & Alexander, 2014). The victim's lawyer stated that if a device 
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such as a smartphone is turned on waiting for ride requests, in essence the driver is 
providing TNC service. Uber contends that although the device was turned on, it was 
only displaying a GPS map, and not information on potential rides. 
The case of the six-year-old accident victim is being watched carefully as there is 
hope it will answer questions to some of the vagaries regarding insurance and TNCs.  The 
CPUC ruling in 2013 states that the TNC coverers drivers who use their app to engage in 
sharing for up to $1 to $1.5 million in liability insurance once the passenger is in the car. 
The accident involving the child raises the question of whose insurance covers an 
accident.  If it is not Uber's insurance providing coverage then is it the driver's personal 
insurance since he/she was not transporting passengers. At present, insurers offering 
personal automobile insurance view any conveyance for pay as a commercial use which 
would void a drivers insurance. Insurance providers are becoming increasingly aware of 
the proliferation of DRS platforms and warn that they will not honor policies of drivers 
using DRS apps (Property Casualty Insurers Association of America, 2014). 
2.5 Conclusions 
 DRS is evolving quickly, and it is still too early to understand the impact of its 
disruption to the car-for-hire industry, transportation in general, and the physical 
environment. As a transportation demand management strategy, DRS promises to fill the 
unused seats in SOVs and by doing so increase lane capacity and level of service 
(Levosky & Greenberg, 2001). Its evolution from Internet to smartphone-based 
applications has been instrumental in its current successful proliferation throughout the 
United States and cities globally. Two fundamental issues, however, threaten DRS in its 
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current smartphone-based iteration.  Although much has already been worked out 
between the TNCs and insurance providers regarding the insurance gap, the time when a 
driver has his/her app on and is waiting for a ride match, questions still remain and are 
being addressed state-by-state. Apart from insurance, the other issue threatening DRS is 
its coexistence with local taxi and limousine companies.  On this issue, stakeholders are 
divided three ways, with municipalities playing a mediator role attempting to bring 
consensus to all parties (Anderson, 2014). 
If left unanswered, questions on insurance will discourage participants, 
particularly drivers who will expose themselves to legal and financial tribulations. As of 
2014, TNC drivers have sufficient coverage, according to the DRS platforms discussed in 
this study.  Drivers are still expected to carry personal automobile insurance which is 
supposed to cover all situations, including when they are driving for a TNC with their app 
off (Table 2.1).  Unfortunately, personal insurers cancel their policies when they discover 
that the driver has been using the vehicle as an independent contractor for a TNC. The 
solution insurers and TNCs are currently working toward is affordable commercial 
insurance for casual DRS drivers with details yet to be determined (Property Casualty 
Insurers Association of America, 2014).  
The adversarial relationship between the DRS platforms and the taxi and 
limousine industry threatens the continued evolution of platforms into regulated TNCs 
capable of providing inexpensive and reliable service. If the taxi industry prevails in 
restricting the number of vehicles a TNC is allowed to operate in each municipality, DRS 
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will be nothing more than an alternative mode of transportation. The promise of reducing 
urban traffic and the subsequent environmental benefits that go with it will be 
diminished. The owners of taxi companies and medallions stand much to lose, and it is in 
their interest to prevent an all out disruption of their industry. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
The users of real-time dynamic ridesharing: Who are they? 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This study examines the current demographic characteristics and usage of 
dynamic ridesharing (DRS). The approach to this empirical research was quantitative 
based on a structured web-survey administered to a targeted audience of 306 DRS users. 
It was informative to learn the similarities and differences among the respondents to 
determine the value of implementing DRS as an alternative transportation mode. 
Descriptive statistics were used to explore DRS users' motivations that will ultimately 
provide opportunities for service improvements and expansion. 
Internet- technology-enabled DRS is an emerging disruptive innovation of the 
transportation industry. DRS is being adopted rapidly by consumers, however little was 
known about the nature and level of activity of early adopters.  Through an examination 
of a sample of the U.S. population who has adopted DRS, we had hoped to understand 
how the new technology is providing alternatives to single-occupant vehicle (SOV) use. 
The study provided a portrait of DRS users in urban areas nationally and explained how 
they are using this mode of transportation. 
49 
 
 
 
Keywords:  dynamic ridesharing, DRS, survey, demographic, Uber, Lyft, SideCar, 
mobile communications  
 
 
3. Introduction 
In the past several years there has been a proliferation of web- and mobile app-
based platforms offering drivers and passengers convenient matching using Internet and 
communication technologies (ICT) that are location-aware and operate in real-time 
(Agatz, et. al, 2012).  The objective of this study was to examine the current state and 
directions of real-time ridesharing by learning the demographic characteristics of users 
via an Internet survey. Real-time ridesharing services such as Uber, Lyft, and SideCar are 
sometimes called Transportation Network Companies (TNCs) by municipal and state 
jurisdictions. TNC status distinguishes these services from traditionally regulated taxis 
and limousines, e.g., medallion-issued for-hire vehicles that are regulated, especially by 
the amount of vehicles that are permitted to operate in any one city on a regular basis. 
TNCs provide point-to-point transportation through app-based platforms on the web and 
commonly accessed through mobile devices.  These services are referred to as Dynamic 
Ridesharing (DRS) within this study. Regarding the taxonomy of DRS's name, there is 
contention among transportation professionals and academics as to what should be the 
proper name of this service.  Other names commonly used include e-hailing, on-demand 
ridesharing, and instant ridesharing. Most academics familiar with the DRS transport 
mode agree that it is primarily ridesharing for-hire assisted by Internet-enabled, location-
aware mobile communications technology, and augmented with social media such as 
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Facebook and Twitter (Siddiqi & Buliung, 2013). Despite this agreement, variations on 
the name persist in the literature.  
Examination of the user characteristics was accomplished via a 30 question 
survey administered to 306 DRS users over the Internet by SurveyMonkey, an Internet 
platform that provides consumer audiences. The author believed that a broad 
understanding of the users of DRS might lend insight into this mode of transportation that 
has the potential to fill the empty seats of single-occupant vehicles (SOVs).  Despite 
push-back from the taxi and limousine industry who view DRS as a serious business 
disruption, DRS has been gaining popularity with consumers as a fast and convenient 
method of transport around busy urban areas. DRS is fast becoming the preferred method 
of securing point-to-point transportation, especially in cities (Rayle, et. al, 2014). 
   Up until this point, assumptions have been made regarding who are the users of 
DRS.  Many application designers have relied on anecdotal information that assumes 
users are primarily young, affluent, city dwellers who would normally use traditional taxi 
and limousine service, but are instead opting for smartphone-based platforms for point-
to-point rides (Nelson, 2015) .  Such assumptions exclude deeper exploration of the full 
demographics, thus precluding DRS-designed systems for suburban and semi-rural areas 
where automobile use, especially SOVs, is dominant.  Although some of the DRS 
platforms have created proprietary data that aims advertising at their primary users, there 
are fewer public studies examining the users of DRS (Rayle, et. al, 2014).         
3.1 What is DRS? 
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DRS is a variant of ridesharing and carpooling that makes use of ICT to match 
rides between drivers and passengers in real-time (Agatz, et. al, 2012).  The primary 
advancement allowing DRS to move forward from its early web-based beginnings is the 
Internet-enabled and location-aware mobile phone, also called a "smartphone", that uses 
an operating system (OS) much like a desktop computer. In conjunction with the 
smartphone, social media has played a role in the successful operation of DRS.  Social 
media websites such as Facebook and Twitter have allowed real-time conversations 
between users.  Social media has also lent facility to trust and reputation systems that 
have removed much of the trepidation inherent in getting into a car with a strange driver.  
Trust and reputation systems also allow passengers to rate driver behavior and vice versa.  
Smartphones also contain the enabling technology that allows drivers and passengers to 
communicate and locate each other in real-time using built-in Global Positioning System 
(GPS) navigation systems.  
Mass adoption of the smartphone began in 2007 with the introduction of the 
iPhone by Apple, Inc., and has since been expanded by a proliferation of applications that 
have made DRS accessible and convenient to those seeking to provide or receive point-
to-point transportation on demand.  In 2008 other smartphones using similar technology 
were introduced, e.g., Android, an open-source operating system introduced by Google, 
Inc., making DRS-use widespread in not only the U.S. but also globally. With 
smartphone ownership reaching 65% of U.S. cellular consumers (Nielsen, 2014), an 
understanding of the demographic profile of DRS users can offer information on possible 
changing attitudes towards the relationship between consumers and their transportation 
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choices.  It is important to understand transportation preference since any changes in the 
sector will have a significant impact on the physical environment.  The most recent 
estimate of transportation's share of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions is 32.9%; currently 
the largest among the energy consuming sectors (Davis, Diegel, & Boundy, 2014, p. 11-
15).      
3.2 Methodology and Instrument 
User data demographic and activity was gathered through a 30–item questionnaire 
capturing reactions to existing DRS systems and rating DRS services. The survey was 
based on closed-end and Likert scale questions that explored users' demographic profiles 
as well as their attitudes towards DRS, and related concepts such as trust and reputation 
systems, automobile cost, and ownership.  The survey was randomly administered to 306 
respondents online by SurveyMonkey, an Internet platform that collects responses from 
an audience it provides for a set fee (Figure 3.1).  The respondents were selected from 
SurveyMonkey's in-house audience members who were asked the qualifying question, 
"Have you in the past 30 days used dynamic ridesharing (Uber, Lyft, etc.)?" Audience 
members did not receive compensation for their participation other than a small monetary 
contribution on their behalf through SurveyMonkey to charities of their choice 
(SurveyMonkey, 2015) (APPENDIX A & B)  
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Figure 3.1: A sample of survey instrument questions and scales.  
3.2.1 Demographic characteristics of DRS users 
Table 3.1 illustrates the demographic characteristics of DRS users. One hundred 
percent of the total sample was from the U.S. Gender was split at 50.65% (155) male, and 
49.35% (151) females.  The race of respondents was predominately white at 88.00% 
(271). The disproportionate percentage of white users corresponds with the general 
demographic profile of U.S. taxi passengers and DRS drivers who, in general, tend to be 
overwhelmingly white.  Relationship status indicates married 45.78% (141), and single, 
never married 33.77% (104) were the majority of all respondents. Most respondents came 
from the Pacific region with 28.53% (214) of responses. The high representation of the 
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Pacific region corresponds to the location's role as the origin of DRS, with San Francisco 
and Seattle populations as two of the earliest cities to adopt the service. Educational 
attainment was high with the majority of respondents reporting college graduation 
41.50% (127) and a high number completing graduate school at 30.39% (93).  
Respondents tended to be not only college graduates, but also holders of higher degrees.  
There was a substantial number of respondents reporting income above $200,000 at 
23.86% (73). It is possible this reflects the Pacific regions reporting dominance where 
incomes tend to be higher than in the rest of the nation. Table 3.1 also indicates  
Table 3.1:  Summary of respondents' demographic profile  
Demographic Results 
Gender Male 50.65 % (155); Female 49.35% (151) 
Age  18-24 17.21% (53); 25 to 34 30.19% (93); 35-44 
15.26% (47); 45-54 17.86% (55); 55 to 64 12.99% 
(40); 65 or older 6.49% (20)  
Relationship status Married 45.78% (141); Widowed 0.97% (3), 
Divorced 2.60%( 8); Separated 0.65% (2); Domestic 
partnership or civil union 1.62% (5); Single, but 
cohabitating with a significant other 14.61% (45); 
and Single, never married 33.77% (104)  
U.S. Region (note: See map) New England 8.00% (60); Middle Atlantic  13.47% 
(101); East North Central 11.47% (86); West North 
Central 5.60% (42); South Atlantic 17.07% (128); 
East South Central 2.80% (21); West South Central 
6.93% (52); Mountain 6.13% (46); Pacific 28.53% 
(214)  
Educational attainment  High school graduate 1.30% (4); Some college 
16.56% (51); College graduate 41.23% (127); Some 
graduate school 10.06% (31); Completed graduate 
school 30.19% (93) 
Income  $0-$24,999 7.19% (22); $25,000-$49,000 11.44% 
(35); $50,000-$74,000 16.34% (50); $75,000-
$99,000 10.31% (31); $100,000-$124,000 11.11% 
(34); $125,000-$149,000 7.19% (22); $150,000-
$174,000 7.52% (7); $175,000-$199,000 5.23% (8); 
$200,000 and up 23.86% (73) 
Ethnicity White 87.99% (271); African-American 0.97% (3); 
Asian 4.55% (14); Multiple races 6.49% (20)  
Employment Employed, full-time 74.35% (229); Employed, part 
time 7.79% (24); Not employed, looking for work 
55 
 
 
 
3.57% (11); Not employed, not looking for work 
4.87%; (15) Retired 8.12% (25); Disabled, not able 
to work 1.30% (4) 
Currently enrolled as a student Yes, full time in  graduate school 4.22% (13); Yes, 
part time in graduate school 3.90% (12); Yes, full 
time in four year undergraduate 6.17% (19); Yes, 
part time in four year undergraduate 0.65% (2); Yes, 
full time in two year undergraduate 0.65% (2); Yes, 
part time in two year undergraduate 0.32% (1); Yes, 
at a high school or equivalent 0.00% (0); Not 
currently enrolled as a student 84.09% (259)  
Housing tenure Rent 49.03% (151); Own 48.38% (149); Other 
2.60% (8) 
Vehicles available per household 0- 7.21% (53); 1- 29.22% (90); 2- 36.36%(112); 3- 
10.71% (33); 4- 4.87% (15); 5+ 1.62% (5) 
Principal Industry of Employment Advertising & Marketing 4.56% (14); Education 
9.77% (30); Finance & Financial Services 7.17% 
(22) Healthcare & Pharmaceuticals 9.12% (28); 
Nonprofit 7.82% (24); Telecommunications, 
Technology, Internet & Electronics 12.70% (39); 
Currently not Employed 8.14% (25); Other 14.66% 
(45)  
that the majority of respondents were employed full time at 74.35% (229). Housing 
tenure for respondents was even with 49.03% (151) reporting they rent, and 48.38% 
(149) reporting ownership. Table 3.1 indicates that the majority of respondents, 36.6% 
(112), had two vehicles available to their household. Only 17.21% (53) had zero vehicles 
available. Respondents were asked if they were currently enrolled as students, and an 
overwhelming majority answered no to this question at 84.09% (259). Thus, the survey 
data can support that DRS is not a phenomenon just among college students. Finally, 
respondents reported a diverse mix of industries that employed them.  The largest 
employment representatives were education at 9.77% (30), healthcare and 
pharmaceuticals at 9.12% (28), Telecommunications, Internet, and electronics at 12.70% 
(39), currently not employed at 8.14% (25), and a large group who answered "other" at 
14.66% (45). Those who answered "other" to the Principal Industry of Employment 
question tended to duplicate categories that were presented in the survey, e.g. technology 
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and engineering for "Telecommunications, Technology, Internet & Electronics", and 
retired and disabled for "I am currently not employed". 
3.3 Demographic Comparisons  
Demographic data was collected for each respondent.  The demographic data 
allowed us to analyze differences between subgroups (e.g. age, gender, educational 
attainment, income, etc.) and aspects of DRS such as selection of platform (e.g. UberX, 
Lyft, SideCar, etc.), frequency of use, access to amenities, replacements of other modes 
(e.g. personal car, bus, subway, etc.), and vehicle maintenance cost among other 
characteristics of DRS.   
3.3.1 Demographic comparison based on gender   
Question 21, "What is your Gender?" explored how male and female users 
perceived DRS, either differently or equally.  The survey results were balanced between 
males and female users: Male 50.7%  (155), Female 48.7% (149) (Table 3.1). Preference 
of DRS platform, Question 4, did not indicate any significant difference in choice among 
males or females, however, it did confirm the dominance of Uber Black/UberX, Lyft, and 
SideCar as the most preferred platforms among either gender (Table 3.2). 
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Table 3.2: Question 4. Which of the DRS applications on your smartphone have you 
used?  Please check all that apply.   
DRS Platform Percent Frequency 
Uber Black 36.73% (119) 
UberX  83.33% (270) 
Lyft 28.09% (91) 
SideCar 3.40% (11) 
Hitch-a-Ride 1.23% (4) 
Car.ma 1.23% (4) 
Summon 1.23% (4) 
Wingz 0.93% (3) 
Other 2.78% (9) 
N = 306 
 
Question 7, " Which mode of transportation are you most often replacing when 
you use dynamic ridesharing?" did reveal differences between the genders in how they 
substituted other modes for DRS.  For example, both males and females selected 
"Personal car" and "Taxi" as the two transportation modes most often replaced by DRS in 
73% (222) of the cases.  In the "Personal car" category, females were found more often 
than males to replace their personal vehicles: male 37.42% (58), female 47.02% (71).  
The response may reflect the economic reality of less access to automobile ownership 
due to lower incomes realized by adult female workers.  Conversely, males in the survey 
tended more than females to replace taxis with DRS: male 37.42% (58), female 23.84% 
(36).  Higher taxi use and its concomitant substitution with DRS might indicate the 
higher spending power of male users who have more access than females to premium on-
demand transportation. The result in the difference among taxi replacement indicates that 
there is evidence of a relationship between gender and taxi replacement (Chi-square = 
14.866, df 8, p = 0.05).  
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Supporting taxi replacement, Question 6 asked, "People use dynamic ridesharing 
to access various services and amenities. Please tell us where you have traveled to using a 
dynamic ridesharing service?" indicates fairly even use among males and females except 
in the category "Work".  When choosing a destination using DRS, males traveled 
significantly more to work than females: male 45.81% (71), female 30.46% (46).  
Question 9 explored a fundamental aspect of DRS: the improved mobility with its 
ability to fill empty vehicle seats.  The implication for this is freer flowing roads that 
utilize lane capacity more efficiently.  Further benefits to the environment are realized 
with more passengers traveling in fewer vehicles. Thus, when asked "When using 
dynamic ridesharing as a passenger, on average how many people, including yourself, 
were passengers in the vehicle?" respondents were being asked to help reveal whether 
DRS works as a transportation demand management (TDM) strategy by reducing single 
occupancy vehicles (SOV), or if it was simply a variation of taxis and limousines cruising 
city streets for hours with a single driver picking up one passenger on average (Figure 
3.2).   Question 9 offered for answer choices: one, two, three more, or not applicable due 
to the respondent's role as primarily a driver, in which case the respondent had a choice 
of opting out of the question.  All in responses in Question 9 assume the exclusion of the 
driver, e.g. an answer of 2 means two passengers and not one driver and one passenger.  
There is fairly even distribution among males and females except in category "three or 
more" where females answered significantly higher than males: male 10.97% (17), 
female 23.18% (35).  What is interesting about this result from a DRS standpoint is that 
reluctance to enter a car with a stranger was often a hindrance to DRS until the 
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introduction of mandatory driving record and criminal background checks for drivers.  
This result could be evidence that such security checks are convincing among female 
respondents.  Statistical significance indicates strong evidence of a relationship between 
gender and number of passengers per vehicle (Chi-Square = 8.615, df = 3, p < 0.05) 
(Figure 3.2). This relationship is further substantiated in Question 11,  "I am less 
concerned about safety and security knowing the driver has had a criminal background 
check and is covered with sufficient liability insurance in the event of an accident.", 
where female respondents answered much higher than males on the scale stating 
"Strongly agree":  male 29.68% (46), female 45.04% (68).  
 
 
Figure 3.2: Gender compared with Question 9: "When using dynamic ridesharing as a 
passenger, how many people, including yourself, were passengers in the vehicle?" 
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In Question 15, "To what extent is not owning a car a significant factor in 
choosing dynamic ridesharing?" females answered with a higher response rate  of a 
combined 33.77% (51) for answer choices "Most significant" and "Significant". Males 
answered significantly lower at 13.55% (21) for "Most significant" and "Significant". 
There is very strong evidence of a relationship between gender and choosing DRS due to 
lack of owning a car (Chi-Square = 17.588. df =  5, p < 0.05).   
Question 16 explored users' attitudes towards DRS as an alternative transportation 
strategy to reduce the automotive impact on the physical environment. The Likert scale 
question of one to five measuring from "Very important" to "Not important" with regards 
to the respondent's choice being made based on environmental considerations.  For this 
question, males answered significantly lower stating that the environment was not 
important in choosing DRS: male 41.94% (65), female 22.53% (34). There is statistical 
evidence of a relationship between gender and choosing DRS for concern regarding the 
physical environment (Chi-Square = 14.511, df = 4, p < 0.05).  
There were similar answers for both genders in Question 19 which asked, "To 
what extent is using dynamic ridesharing a better option than using public 
transportation?" Both genders answered affirmatively that DRS was a better option than 
public transportation.  The Likert question again had a scale of one to five ranging from 
"Better" to "Not better". Within the first three categories of the scale, males answered 
affirmatively 89.04% (138), and females 94.04% (142).  The result taken from a sample 
from each region of the nation could indicate an overall failure of public transportation 
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nationally. Further research is needed to confirm whether this is localized to a specific 
region(s) or a national issue.    
However, when asked in Question 20, "Would you consider moving to a larger 
home in an area with limited or no public transportation if dynamic ridesharing was a 
reliable option?" the answer was generally negative.  Males answered the question scale 
with a response of  "Moderately consider, 25.16% (39), and females 32.45% (49).  The 
"Not considered" category was the highest with males answering  38.06% (59), and 
females 25.83% (39).  Hence, DRS appears to be appreciated more by urban users who 
see it as a substitute for public transportation. Suburban, or potential suburban users, do 
not see DRS as a transportation system that fits in less populated areas.  This is 
significant as the majority of automobile activity is in less densely populated areas and 
could benefit from an adaptation of DRS to a suburban setting (Badger, 2015).    
In summary, there is little difference in the way males and females use DRS.  
However, there appears to be statistical significance in some areas to indicate differences 
based on gender.  The results indicate that for males, it appears that DRS is used as a 
replacement for taxis and limousines, or in situations where a for-hire vehicle (FHV) is 
appropriate, i.e. business travel, event travel, etc.  Also, males are less concerned with the 
criminal background check and screening of drivers and less concerned with the 
environmentally positive aspects of DRS.  Female users are most often replacing a 
personal car or bus with DRS.  As indicated in Question 15, females answered 
significantly higher than males regarding a lack of car ownership as a factor in choosing 
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DRS.  This could be indicative of socioeconomic factors that constrain car ownership for 
female DRS users. 
3.3.2 Demographic comparison based on age 
 When respondents were asked about their age in question 22, they responded as 
in Table 3.3.  Nearly 50% (47.06%) of respondents were in the first two categories 
representing 18 to 34-year-olds. As a single cohort, the majority of the young DRS users 
were in the 25 to 34 group representing almost one-third of all respondents: 30.07% (92).  
The two youngest groups represents the so-called Millennial Generation, a name 
attributed to the demographic cohort representing people born approximately between 
1980 and 2000 (Strauss & Howe, 2000). Thus, the survey revealed that millennials were 
nearly half of all DRS, a statistic in line with other studies that show this group trending 
away from car ownership and becoming more deeply invested in social media and its 
attendant technologies such as smartphones and tablets (Nelson, 2015).   
Table 3.3: Question 21.  What is your age? 
Age group Percent Frequency 
18 to 24 16.99% 52 
25 to 34 30.07% 92 
35 to 44 15.36% 47 
45 to 54 17.97% 55 
55 to 64 13.07% 40 
65 or older 6.54% 20 
Total 100.00% 306 
N= 306 
When asked about which mode of transportation was being replaced with DRS, 
the 18 to 24 and 25 to 34 cohorts answered that they were mostly replacing their personal 
car (30.19% and 38.71% respectively) and taxi (20.75% and 33.33% respectively).  An 
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anomaly was observed, however, among the 18 to 24 cohort who reported replacing 
"walking" with DRS at 18.87% (10). This high score was significantly more than the next 
highest group, 45 to 54, who reported 3.64% (2) replacing walking with DRS. The 
explanation for this high score could be attributed to the group's lower income potential 
and its implication for lower car ownership and taxi use.  Respondents of the next three 
cohorts, 35 to 44, 45 to 54, and 55 to 64, reported replacing a personal car and taxi more 
often than other modes, however, percentages for personal car were higher than the 
younger cohorts: 57.45% (27), 50.91% (28), and 45.00% (18) respectively. Explanations 
for such high replacement of personal vehicles with DRS can be attributed to the higher 
degree of car ownership among these cohorts (Figure 3.3). Crosstabulation was 
performed comparing age and mode of transportation substituted for DRS.  The results 
indicated that there is very strong evidence of a relationship between age and the mode of 
transportation substituted for DRS (Chi-Square = 86.815, df = 40, p < 0.001). 
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Figure 3.3: Age compared with replacement of transport mode with DRS 
 
Users were asked whether they connected to other transport modes such as buses, 
streetcars or subways to complete their trips.  All age groups responded "Never" in more 
than 50% of cases with "Sometime" in about one-third of cases. The purpose of this 
question was to determine whether DRS was being used intermodally to connect with 
public transportation.  The reply "Sometimes" indicates an area for future research and 
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application of DRS. Perhaps in less densely populated areas, DRS could be promoted as a 
means of building an itinerary that is less reliant on one's personal vehicle (Figure 3.4). 
 
Figure 3.4: Age compared with "When using dynamic ridesharing as a passenger, do you 
connect to other transport modes such as buses, streetcars, or subways to complete your 
trip?" 
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Users were asked about how many people on average, including themselves, were 
passengers in a vehicle. The responses were one, two, or three or more.  This question 
tries to explore the fundamental benefit of DRS, which is the ability to fill empty vehicle 
seats thereby reducing road congestion through the efficient use of lane capacity. There 
was normal distribution among the responses for the two younger cohorts, 18 to 34. 
However, an anomaly is observed in the 18 to 24 group showing a higher response rate 
for "three or more" than all other age groups.  Among the 18 to 24-year-olds who were 
asked the number of passengers in a vehicle, 34% responded with "three or more". This 
response rate was approximately two times higher than all other age groups.  
Crosstabulation analysis for age groups (Question 22) compared to number of passengers 
in vehicle (Question 9) indicate that there is very strong evidence of a relationship 
between the variables (Chi-square = 39.097, df = 15, p < 0.001).        
 Respondents were asked "To what extent is not owning a car a significant factor 
in choosing dynamic ridesharing?". The question answer was comprised of a scale of one 
to five with one indicating "Most significant" and five indicating "Not significant". 
Respondents who were DRS drivers were given the choice of opting out of this question. 
All age groups tended to have a high response rate indicating that the lack of car 
ownership was either "Less significant" or "Not significant" as a factor in choosing DRS.  
However, the 18-24 group indicated that 24.42% (14) felt that not owning a car was 
"Most significant" in their decision to use DRS.  The response rate of the 18-24 cohort 
was significantly higher than the response to "Most significant" of all other groups.  
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In the survey, Question 16 was included to explore respondents' attitudes 
regarding the environmental benefits of DRS. In an early study of DRS, Levofsky and 
Greenberg (2001) examined the environmental degradation attributed severe traffic 
congestion. More recently, Deakin, Frick, and Shively (2012) conducted a feasibility 
study conducted at the University of California at Berkeley. According to the results of 
the study, participants stated that their primary reason for sharing rides was to save time 
and money. However, a secondary reason given was to reduce environmental impacts 
caused by driving.  The question in our survey went more directly to the issue and asked, 
"To what extent is reducing impacts on the physical environment a significant factor in 
choosing dynamic ridesharing?" The 55 to 64 cohort had the highest response rate 
favoring DRS as a means to reduce negative impacts on the environment (Figure 3.5). 
The 55 to 64 group rated that is was "Moderately important", 37.50% (15).  The group 
also had the lowest negative response among all groups, i.e. "Not important", 22.50% (9). 
When users were asked, "To what extent is using dynamic ridesharing a better 
option than using a regular taxi or hired limousine?", on a scale of one to five, with one 
meaning "Better" and five meaning "Not better", all cohorts entered a response rate above 
50% in the  "Better" category.  The 55 to 64 group had the highest response rate of  
"Better" at 62.50% (25) (Figure 3.6). The unanimity of the response was similar in 
question 19 which asked, "To what extent is using dynamic ridesharing a better option 
than using public transportation?".  All except cohort, 65 or older, answered with a 
highest response rate of "Better" on the scale.  The 65 or older group gave its highest 
rating to "Somewhat better", 45.00% (9) (Figure 3.7). 
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Finally, age categorized respondents were asked to rate on a scale of one to five 
the question, "Would you consider moving to a larger home in an area with limited or no 
public transportation if dynamic ridesharing was a reliable option?" . Response by the age 
cohorts was similarly mixed as with gender in the previous section. The younger groups, 
18 to 24 and 25 to 34, gave highest response rate to "Moderately consider", 33.96% (18) 
and 36.56% (34) respectively.  The older groups were unanimous in giving the highest 
response to "Not consider".  
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Figure 3.5. Age compared with Question 16 "To what extent is reducing impacts on the 
physical environment a significant factor in choosing dynamic ridesharing?" 
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Figure 3.6. Age compared with Question 18 "To what extent is using dynamic 
ridesharing a better option than using a regular taxi or hired limousine?"  
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Figure 3.7. Age compared to Question 19 "To what extent is using dynamic ridesharing a 
better option than using public transportation?" 
3.3.3 Demographic comparison based on educational attainment  
The survey asked respondents to report their highest level of education completed.  
The majority of respondents reported educational attainment from "Some college" to 
"Completed graduate school", 98.04% (302). There were zero respondents reporting the 
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following: "Primary school" and "Some high school".  The following categories had one 
respondent each: "Did not attend school", and "Vocational or trade school". It appears to 
be sufficient to let the basic statistics stand as they are due to the nature of the data being 
skewed so greatly towards college educated respondents. Future research into reasons 
why individuals below college level education are nearly absent may be necessary. 
Ethnicity in question 25 on the survey was also skewed toward White at 90% (271). In 
the United States, there are differences in educational attainment by race with attainment 
higher for Whites and Asians than for African-Americans and Hispanics (Ryan & 
Siebens, 2009). 
3.2.4 Demographic comparison based on race 
When asked to identify their ethnicity respondents reported White with near 
unanimity, 90%, (271). The remaining 10% was comprised of Black or African-
American, 0.97%, (3), Asian, 4.55% (14), and multiple races, 6.49% (20).  Two groups 
reported zero respondents: American Indian or Alaskan Native, and Native Hawaiian or 
other Pacific Islander.  We included White and Non-White Hispanic cohorts in the 
original survey (Appendix A).1   
Since Question 25 was skewed heavily toward the White category, little statistical 
evidence could be gleaned that was relevant to DRS. When race was compared to 
Question 31, "Which of the following best describes the principal industry of your 
employment?", Whites and Asians had similar response rates for the two most often 
                                                          
1 White and Non-White Hispanic cohorts were deleted from the live instrument due to error in the survey 
administration by the vendor.  
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chosen industries: Education, and Telecommunication, Technology, Internet, and 
Electronics: 9.63% (26), 12.22% (33), and 14.29% (2), 28.57% (4) respectively. African-
Americans selected Non-profit unanimously, 100% (3). 
3.3.5 Demographic comparison based on housing tenure 
When DRS users were asked about housing tenure, they reported a near even split 
between renting, 49.03% (151) and owning their homes, 48.38% (149).  The remainder 
was comprised of respondents who answered "other," 2.60% (8). All but one of the 
"other" category referred to either living at home with a relative or in a college dorm.  
One respondent reported renting and owning two residences.  
Distribution was normal and evenly split when respondents named the DRS 
platforms that they have used.  As in other demographic groups, the majority of users had 
chosen among Uber Black, UberX, and Lyft.  UberX, Uber's basic ridesharing service, 
was the most often reported with renters giving a response rate of 91.39% (138) and 
homeowners responding lower at 75.17% (112).  Homeowners tended to use Uber Black 
more often than renters, 45.64% (68) and 27.15% (41) respectively.  Uber Black is Uber's 
premium service providing late model luxury cars and is primarily used for airport and 
special event transportation. 
When users were asked, "To what extent is not owning a car a significant factor in 
choosing dynamic ridesharing?", renters and homeowners responded as in Figure 3.8.  
Renters responded that not owning a car was a significant factor in choosing a DRS 
service,25.83% (39).  In contrast, homeowners responded that car ownership was not a 
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significant factor, 38.93% (58). Respondents who were primarily DRS users were given 
the opportunity to opt out of this question. 
Respondents were asked in Question 16, "To what extent is reducing impacts on 
the physical environment a significant factor in choosing dynamic ridesharing?", they 
replied as in Figure 3.9. The majority in each cohort answered "Not important": renters 
30.46% (46), and owners 34.90% (52).  Further research on users' attitudes about DRS 
would benefit promoting its environmentally beneficial offerings.  The age cohort 55 to 
64 appears to thus be far the only demographic group that appreciated this aspect of DRS 
(Figure 3.5).  
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Figure 3.8. Housing tenure compared to Question 15 "To what extent is not owning a car 
a significant factor in choosing dynamic ridesharing?" 
 
Question 20 asked users "Would you consider moving to a larger home in an area 
with limited or no public transportation if dynamic ridesharing were a reliable option?" 
The purpose of this question was to examine users' openness to DRS in less densely 
populated areas.  Renters tended to favor DRS in a less densely populated setting giving a 
response rate of "Moderately consider" on the Likert scale question, 30.46% (46).  
Homeowners gave a response of "Not consider", 42.28% (63), perhaps due to their 
familiarity with suburban settings that are usually seen as the realm of the private 
automobile. 
3.2.6 Demographic comparison based on relationship status 
When asked "Which of the following best describes your current relationship 
status?", the split was even between "Married"/"In a domestic partnership or civil union", 
47.40%  (146) and "Single, never married"/"Single, but cohabitating with a significant 
other" 48.38%, (149) (Figure 3.10) Widowed, divorced,  
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Figure 3.9. Housing tenure compared to "To what extent is reducing impacts on the 
physical environment a significant factor in choosing dynamic ridesharing?" 
 
and separated comprised the smallest cohort with 4.22% (13), perhaps related to the fact 
that there were fewer respondents in the 65 and above cohort, 6.54% (20)  (Table 3.3).   
Regarding relationship status, there was general unanimity among cohorts in 
Question 17, "To what extent is not owning a car a significant factor in choosing dynamic 
ridesharing?". Both the "Married"/"In a domestic partnership or civil union" and "Single, 
never married"/"Single, but cohabitating with a significant other" groups gave highest 
response rates to the combined scale answers "Less significant", and "Not significant", 
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73.05% (103) and 55.55% (25) respectively (Figure 3.11). The results indicate that based 
on relationship status, users were making choice to choose DRS irrespective of car 
ownership 
When users were asked which mode of transportation was most often being 
replaced by DRS (Question 7), they responded as in Figure 3.12. As with demographic 
groups previously examined in the survey, the majority were replacing their person car 
and taxis with DRS. There is very strong evidence of a relationship between relationship 
status and substitution of transportation mode with DRS (Chi-square = 89.768, df = 48, p 
< 0.001).     
3.3.7 Demographic comparison based on the number of available vehicles in 
household 
In Question 28, users were asked about the number of available vehicles in their 
household (Figure 3.13). Vehicles included passenger cars, vans, light trucks, or 
motorcycles.  
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Figure 3.10. Question 27, relationship status of DRS users. 
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Figure 3.11. Relationship status compared to Question 17 "To what extent is not owning 
a car a significant factor in choosing dynamic ridesharing?" 
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Figure 3.12. Relationship status compared with Question 7, "Which mode of 
transportation are you most often replacing when you use dynamic ridesharing?" 
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Figure 3.13. Question 28, "Number of available vehicles in your household." 
The survey did not specify the type of vehicle. Vehicle availability per household is often 
associated with income, energy consumption, and residential density (Brownstone & 
Golob, 2009).   
This study looked at income asking, "What is your approximate average 
household income?" (Figure 3.14). The highest response rate was the "$200,000 and up" 
category, 23.86% (73).  High income correlated with the results of the vehicles per 
household question.  Users with zero vehicles per household had an even distribution of 
average household income as is seen in Figure 3.15.    
When users were asked about mode substitution, they responded as noted in 
Figure 3.16.  As with other demographic groups in the study, personal car, and taxi again 
received the highest response rates. Users with five or more vehicles available most often 
replaced their personal car 80.00% (4) of the time. There is very strong evidence of a 
relationship between vehicles per household and transportation mode substitution (Chi-
Square = 119.730, df = 40, p < 0.001).  
Users were asked how many people, including themselves, were passengers in the 
DRS vehicle. Based on the number of available vehicles per household the respondents 
answered as in Figure 3.17.  The response rate in the 5 or more category was once again 
very high with users reporting three or more passengers per vehicle, 60.00% (3).  There 
was also evidence of a relationship between the number of vehicles available per 
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household and number of passengers per vehicle (Chi-square = 27.608, df = 15, p < 
0.05). 
Question 10 asked DRS drivers to estimate the total monthly cost for gasoline, 
auto insurance, car payment, maintenance, tolls, and parking.  The highest response rate 
was reported in households with five or more vehicles available, 40.00% (2) (Figure 
3.18). Also, there was very strong evidence of a relationship between vehicles per 
household and the DRS driver's cost for vehicle maintenance (Chi-square = 74.158, df = 
25, p < 0.001).  
Not owning a car was predictably rated "Most significant" on a Likert scale to 
users in households with zero vehicles available, 56.60% (30) (Figure 3.19). Users who 
were DRS drivers were given the opportunity to opt out of this question. Thus, there was 
very strong evidence of a relationship between zero vehicles available per household and 
not owning a car when choosing to use DRS (Chi-square = 134.460, df = 25, p < 0.001). 
3.3.8 Demographic comparison based on employment status   
When users were asked about employment status, they responded as in Figure 
3.20.  The majority of respondents reported being employed full time, 74.35% (229).   
3.3.9 Demographic comparison based on enrollment as a student   
User were asked about their status as a student (Question 30) and reported as in 
Figure 3.21. The overwhelming majority reported they were not currently enrolled as a 
student, 84.09% (259).   
83 
 
 
 
3.3.10 Demographic comparison based on principal industry of employment 
When users were asked about their principal industry of employment, they responded as 
in Table 3.4. Four industries were dominant among DRS users: Advertising and 
marketing, 4.56% (14), Education, 9.77% (30), Nonprofit, 7.82% (24), and 
Telecommunications, Technology, Internet, and Electronics, 12.70% (39). When asked in 
Question 5, "How long have you been using dynamic ridesharing?", all four of the 
principal, dominant industries gave high response rates to six months to one year, and 
more than one year. There is evidence of a relationship between the principal industry of 
employment and the length of time one uses a DRS service (Chi-square = 109.579, df  = 
80, p < 0.05). 
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Figure 3.14. Question 32, "What is your approximate average household income?" 
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Figure 3.15. Vehicles per household compared with Question 32 "What is your 
approximate average income?"  
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Figure 3.16. Number of available vehicles per household compared with Question 7 
"Which mode of transportation are you most often replacing when you use dynamic 
ridesharing?" 
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Figure 3.17. Number of vehicles per household (Question 28) compared with Question 9 
"When using dynamic ridesharing as a passenger, on average how many people, 
including yourself, were passengers in the vehicle?"  
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Figure 3.18. Number of  vehicles per household (Question 28) compared with Question 
10 "If you are primarily a driver, on average what is your total monthly cost for gasoline, 
auto insurance, car payment (if applicable), maintenance, tolls, and parking." 
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Figure 3.19. Number of vehicles per household (Question 28) compared with Question 
15 "To what extent is not owning a car a significant factor in choosing dynamic 
ridesharing?"  
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Figure 3.20. Question 29, "Which of the following categories best describes your 
employment status?" 
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Figure 3.21. Question 30, "Are you currently enrolled as a student?"    
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Table 3.4:  
Which of the following best describes the principal industry of your employment? 
 
Answer Options 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
Advertising & Marketing 4.6% 14 
Agriculture 0.0% 0 
Airlines & Aerospace (including Defense) 1.0% 3 
Automotive 0.3% 1 
Business Support & Logistics 3.3% 10 
Construction, Machinery, and Homes 1.6% 5 
Education 9.8% 30 
Entertainment & Leisure 2.9% 9 
Finance & Financial Services 7.2% 22 
Food & Beverages 2.6% 8 
Government 2.0% 6 
Healthcare & Pharmaceuticals 9.1% 28 
Insurance 1.6% 5 
Manufacturing 3.3% 10 
Nonprofit 7.8% 24 
Retail & Consumer Durables 2.9% 9 
Real Estate 2.0% 6 
Telecommunications, Technology, Internet & Electronics 12.7% 39 
Transportation & Delivery 1.6% 5 
Utilities, Energy, and Extraction 1.0% 3 
I am currently not employed 8.1% 25 
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Other (please specify) 14.7% 45 
answered questions 306 
N = 306 
3.3.11 Demographic comparison based on US region 
The DRS survey was divided into nine US regions (Figures 3.23 & 3.23):  
1. New England (Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode 
Island,         Connecticut) 
2. Middle Atlantic (New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania) 
3. East North Central (Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin) 
4. West North Central (Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North Dakota, South 
Dakota,     Nebraska, Kansas) 
5. South Atlantic (Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, Virginia, West 
Virginia,     North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida) 
6. East South Central (Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi) 
7. West South Central (Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas) 
8. Mountain (Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, 
Utah,     Nevada) 
9. Pacific (Washington, Oregon, California, Alaska, Hawaii) 
 
As a demographic group, DRS users by US region are represented in the bar chart 
in Figure 3.24 The Pacific region represents the largest cohort with 28.53% (214) user.  
The Eastern Seaboard combined (regions 1, 2, and 5) the most users, 38.54% (289).  
  When users were asked how long they used DRS, almost all regions gave the 
highest response rate to "More than one year". Only the West South Central region 
divided between "Less than one month" and "More than one year", 28.57% (4) each 
respectively (Figure 3.24). 
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When users were asked "Which mode of transportation are you most often 
replacing when you use dynamic ridesharing?",  they responded as in Figure 3.26. Two 
regions, South Atlantic and East South Central more than any others used DRS to 
substitute their person car, 59.62% (31), and 66.67% (6) (Figure 3.25). There was strong 
evidence of a relationship between US region and mode of transportation substituted for 
DRS (Chi-Square = 96.316, df = 64, p < 0.05). 
Users were asked “To what extent is reducing impacts on the physical 
environment a significant factor in choosing dynamic ridesharing?" and they responded 
as in Figure 3.26. The regions that gave the highest response rates of "Moderately 
important" on the Likert scale were New England, West North Central, South Atlantic, 
and Middle Atlantic, 47.06% (8), 37.50% (6), 32.69% (17), and 29.27% (12) 
respectively. The region that cared the least about the environmental significance of 
choosing DRS was the Mountain region, rating it as "Not important", 50.00% (9).  
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Figure 3.22. Respondents were divided into nine US regions.   
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Figure 3.23. Respondents were representative of nine US regions  
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Figure 3.24. US region compared to Question 5, "How long have you been using 
dynamic ridesharing?" 
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Figure 3.25. US region compared to Question 7, "Which mode of transportation are you 
most often replacing when you use dynamic ridesharing?"  
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Figure 3.26. US region compared with Question 16, To what extent is reducing impacts 
on the physical environment a significant factor in choosing dynamic ridesharing?  
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3.4 Conclusions 
 
As shown in the analysis of the demographic groups, the data indicated 
statistically significant differences among subgroups were compared to hypothetical 
situations regarding the current state of DRS. Many of these differences, however, were 
based on small segments of subgroups, some representing 1 to 5 respondents out of the 
total sample. Thus, these smaller differences are not likely to yield practical suggestions 
for further implementation or improvement of DRS. Additional research with more 
focused survey questions and a larger sample can assist in providing more conclusive 
results. 
From the data, several assumptions could easily be hypothesized regarding the 
demographic profile of a typical DRS user. Although some real differences exist, it is 
obvious that many subgroups were not different.  This suggests that the different 
demographic subgroups shared similar evaluations of DRS. Below are some implications 
of the demographic results and how they can be interpreted for further research. 
3.4.1 Implications regarding the race subgroup  
Overall, the ethnicity of the sample was predominately White, 90%, (271).  There 
was some significant response rate from the Asian and multiple races subgroups, 4.55% 
(14) and 6.49% (20) respectively. The strikingly low representation of African-
Americans in the sample, 0.97% (3), would suggest additional research.   
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Based on the results of this survey, the overwhelmingly White representation 
supports anecdotal evidence suggesting DRS drivers are statistically more likely to be 
White than traditional urban taxi drivers.  The author tested UberX while at a conference 
in Chicago during the spring of 2015.  UberX was used to make three local trips: two 
within the city, and one to the airport. All UberX trips were in vehicles driven by what 
appeared to be people of European or South Asian ancestry. UberX vehicles are not 
easily identified with external graphics; however, traditional taxis in Chicago bear the 
usual markings of the company and the fact that it is a vehicle for hire.  Based on a non-
representative visual sample, traditional taxis were predominately driven by people who 
appeared to be of East Asian or Sub-Saharan African ancestry.  These casual observations 
are not suggested to be rigorous scientific analysis. However, they do provide a basis for 
future research.   
3.4.2 Implications regarding the age subgroup               
The data suggested that DRS users tend to be "millennials" or people born 
between 1980 and 2004.  As a single cohort, 18 to 34-year-olds represented 47% (144) of 
the respondents. What is significant regarding this cohort is the consumer research 
showing these respondents trending away from purchasing personal vehicles and shifting 
their focus instead to social media and its supporting technologies (Nelson, 2015). 
Further research needs to explore whether this shift is due to economic factors, such as a 
weak economy and high student loan debt, or if there is a fundamental change in progress 
towards car ownership  
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3.4.3 Implications regarding subgroup attitudes toward environmental benefits  
The environmental benefits of DRS include less congestion and resource 
consumption due to more efficient use of vehicles. This aspect of DRS seemed to escape 
most respondents who tended to give negative response rates when asked if they included 
environmental benefits in their selection process of DRS.  Previous research by Deakin, 
Frick, and Shively (2012) indicated that saving money and time were the primary 
decision factors for choosing DRS.  Little has changed in this attitude since 2012, perhaps 
suggesting that DRS platforms may want to stress the environmental benefits of 
ridesharing in their promotional material.  It is quite possible that he layman fails to make 
the rather complex transportation planning connections between utilizing as many seats 
as possible in a vehicle and the consequences of a national fleet comprised primarily of 
SOVs. 
3.4.4 Implications regarding users' attitude towards public transportation 
In Question 19, the majority of respondents rated DRS as a better option than 
public transportation. The highest response rate was "Better", 46.75% (144).  The lowest 
response rate was "Not better", 2.60% (8).  Considering that most DRS services need a 
densely populated area to work reliably, one can assume that most respondents lived in 
compact urban areas.  The implication of the data's negative response towards public 
transportation reveals an overall failure of the national public transportation system.  One 
could extrapolate from these results that DRS, implemented on a larger scale, could 
ultimately threaten the existence of public transportation as municipalities see ridership 
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decline with DRS use.  Already, automobile manufacturers are developing multi-
passenger transport vehicles based on DRS principals (Badger, 2015). The Ford Motor 
company is currently experimenting with a van that is connected to a ridesharing app.  
The strategy for this is two-fold:  anticipation of the decline in vehicle purchases by 
millennials and the eventual need by municipalities for a new public transportation 
vehicle that is responsive to users' input and more flexible in its destinations. The 
experimental vehicle called a "dynamic social shuttle)  it is not being developed as a 
fixed-route system, but one that offers passengers direct door-to-door service. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Legal and Administrative Issues Affecting Dynamic Ridesharing Platforms in  
San Francisco and New York 
 
Abstract    
Dynamic ridesharing (DRS) platforms have been creating disruption in the urban 
transportation industry by offering both drivers and passengers attractive alternatives to 
traditional taxi and limousine services.  Drivers are using it to earn income utilizing their 
personal vehicles. Passengers are attracted to the simplicity of summoning a ride with the 
touch of an icon on their smartphones. Other features, such as cashless payment, tipping 
included in the price, and seeing how soon your car will arrive in real-time on a 
smartphone  map are among the other major features that have captured the attention of 
many urban dwellers.  According to statistics gathered by the New York Tax and 
Limousine Commission  the DRS platforms Uber now outnumbers all yellow medallion 
taxis (Pramuk, 2015). 
Much of the success of DRS platforms, however, has been hard fought. In each 
city a DRS platforms enters, regulatory agencies grapple with protests from incumbent 
industries that stand to lose to the disruptors.  In some cities, highly-valued classic taxi 
106 
 
 
 
medallions, permits used to operate taxis and a method of regulation dating from the 
1930s, are threatened with becoming obsolete.   
This review examines a chronology of the legal and administrative challenges to 
DRS platforms in two premiere cities, San Francisco and New York.  The cities each 
have their unique role in the disruption process and by comparing and contrasting events, 
a picture emerges of similarities and differences that provide the context for this new and 
complex transportation service.  
Keywords: dynamic ridesharing, DRS, New York, San Francisco, disruption innovation, 
taxis, regulation, Uber. Lyft. 
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4. Introduction 
Dynamic ridesharing (DRS) applications (APPS) such as Uber and Lyft have 
gained mass popularity in cities across the United States and globally. San Francisco and 
New York are not exceptions and were chosen for this study to compare the legal and 
administrative issues that DRS services faced in order to overcome resistance to 
competing stakeholders and prosper in these challenging urban environments. The cities 
for this review were selected due to their unique for-hire vehicle (FHV) histories.  Due to 
the cities' statures as centers of innovation, (i.e. for San Francisco technological and for 
New York financial and cultural) the legal and administrative issues facing DRS 
providers are being watched carefully by all who have a stake in the operations of urban 
transportation.  Their outcomes will possibly be precedents for the future direction of 
DRS. Thus, both cities can be viewed as test beds for the disruption of the transportation 
industry by DRS.   
Historically, San Francisco's "taxi problem" can be traced to the political 
environment of the 1970s when organizations sought to deregulate many industries by 
removing government controls and handing much decision making back to the private 
sector. In San Francisco's case, this was to address perceptions of unfairness and 
corruption in the taxi industry (Newsham, 2000).  In New York, regulation of the taxicab 
industry can be traced back to 1937 when then-Mayor Fiorello H. La Guardia signed the 
Haas Act. The law introduced licensing of taxis and the medallion system.  The 
medallion, an aluminum plate affixed to the hood of a vehicle grants official status to the 
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owner to use the taxi to transport passengers for a regulated fee. The number of 
medallions issued by the city was fixed then, as it still is in 2015, and can only be 
changed by the Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC), the municipal agency that has 
jurisdiction over FHVs (Van Gelder, 1996; New York City Taxi and Limousine 
Commission, 2015).  New York medallion prices rose to a high in late 2013, when two 
medallions were sold for $1 million each, the highest price recorded since they were 
issued in 1937 (Flegenheimer, 2013).  As of 2015, medallion prices are dropping sharply 
to an average of $805,000, likely due to the launches of DRS services like Uber, Lyft, 
and SideCar (Barro, 2015)  Some financial analysts have claimed that the medallion is 
becoming obsolete as DRS continues to disrupt in cities whose taxicab industry uses this 
system (Hickman, 2015; Barro, 2015).   Fleet owners and private holders of taxi 
medallions have become concerned that the traditional FHV industry will cease to exist 
unless local and state governments step in immediately (Madhani, 2015). In light of this 
concern, there was reassurance offered from government sources such as New York TLC 
Commissioner Meera Joshi. Commissioner Joshi states that the core and the majority of 
passengers in New York will still choose hand-hailing (Caruthers, 2015).  The 
commissioner bases evidence on her contention that the price of yellow taxi medallions is 
not tied to the health of the greater industry. She cites the increasing value of the large 
number of green all-borough2cabs as evidence that there is enough diversification within 
                                                          
2 In 2013, the TLC introduced the Boro Taxi program that has licensed uniquely green colored taxis to 
serve areas of the city that have been commonly excluded by yellow medallion taxis. Green Boro Taxis 
service all of the five boroughs of New York except south of West 110th and East 96th Streets in 
Manhattan, and both La Guardia and John F. Kennedy International Airports in Queens.        
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the industry to absorb Uber and other DRSs without threatening yellow taxi medallions 
(Figure 4.1).    
 
Figure 4.1: TLC authorized green all-boro taxi licensed to serve areas of New York 
normally excluded by yellow medallion taxis (Source: Author, 2014).  
 
This study used primary and secondary sources from the internet to create a 
chronology of legal and administrative issues that could be compared and contrasted with 
each city.  Similarities and differences among the issues exist for both San Francisco and 
New York.  
4.1 Methodology and Data Gathering  
 The process of gathering the data for the chronology required the use of primary 
and secondary sources retrieved from Internet searches that were conducted for each of 
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the case cities.  Primary sources used to assemble the legal chronologies were mostly 
taken from blogs and legal documents.  Secondary sources included pertinent press 
coverage in articles found in online versions of print newspapers, online news sources, 
online versions of news magazines, and other mass media such as online television or 
radio news programs.   
4.2 San Francisco 
 
4.2.1 Introduction  
San Francisco's proximity to the Silicon Valley technopole has guaranteed its 
place as a center of disruptive innovation (Castells & Hall, 1994). From this region, 
companies have emerged that have left their imprint on society and business since the 
mid-twentieth century. Companies such as Apple, Hewlett-Packard, Xerox, eBay, etc., 
have each been instrumental in the disruptive innovation of long-term industries 
(Christensen, 2003).  Its concentration of high-technology workers, Ph.D.s, and 
entrepreneurs makes it a logical origination point and birthplace for Internet-enabled and 
location-aware ridesharing services. San Francisco's role in the development of DRS is 
unique, yet as an originator the city has been a template for the global proliferation of 
companies like Uber and Lyft. For its foundational role, it was selected as the leading 
case study city for a chronological review of legal and major transportation issues 
affecting DRS.  
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The city's image of confident tech workers and cutting-edge services is a natural fit for 
DRS, which promises to be the new method of urban transportation for the coming 
century.  That promise, however, has been impeded at times by parties whose established 
place in the urban transportation matrix is threatened by DRS. 
4.2.2 Background  
Prior to DRS's arrival in San Francisco in the form of Uber in 2009, and Lyft and 
SideCar in 2012, the city's traditional yellow taxi industry already had a long-standing 
reputation for poor and unreliable service.  A brief review of San Francisco's taxi industry 
of the past 35 years will help to instruct why the citizens of this innovative city were 
eager to accept a new, untested model that would not only reform, but remake urban 
transportation.  
The late 1970s were a time when deregulation of transportation industries were 
seen as a solution to problems inherent in these organizations.  A major event of this 
period in history was the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. The Act was a federal law 
designed to remove government control of the commercial aviation industry. Other 
transportation modes followed with their versions of laws calling for either deregulation 
or regulation.  In the case of San Francisco, Proposition K arrived in 1978 and required 
that all taxis have permits issued only to natural individuals and in one name only 
(Charter Reform Working Group, 2007).  Proposition K also imposed a driving 
requirement so that only working taxicab drivers could hold permits.  
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Hence, the history of the San Francisco's "taxi problem" can be traced to the year 
1978 when ballot initiative Proposition K was passed to correct perceptions of unfairness 
and corruption within the industry (Newsham, 2000).  Under Proposition K, the city of 
San Francisco would issue taxi medallions to persons paying an annual fee (San 
Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency, 2014). The taxi medallions used as 
operating permits was an old concept dating back to 1937 in New York (Van Gelder, 
1996). Under Proposition K's medallion system, the owner leases it to an experienced taxi 
driver who uses it to generate income. The arrival of Proposition K also placed a limit on 
the number of medallions that could be authorized at any time. Limits on the number of 
medallions were gradually increased to keep pace with demand, however, as late as 2014, 
San Franciscans were still complaining about the difficulty of ordering a taxicab (Said, 
2014). 
According to Newsham (2000), the medallion system implemented in 1978 was 
an attempt to discourage speculators from bidding up the prices of medallions.  Thus, 
medallions were only awarded to individuals who would rent taxis from established firms 
rather than hold on to them for financial speculation.   Although Proposition K's original 
intent was to protect workers by removing medallions from speculators, other problems 
were unmet. Since 1978 taxi drivers had been operating as independent contractors of the 
established cab companies.  This system ensured income for the cab companies who were 
paid by drivers to lease taxicabs.  Thus, the cab company was guaranteed an income 
regardless of the amount or lack of money generated by the cab during the driver's shift. 
Cab companies also benefited from the independent contractor relationship with drivers 
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because they were relieved of paying social security and disability taxes and were 
shielded from the threat of unionization (Newsham, 2000). These were all items that 
would normally be required of companies when workers are actual employees. For most 
of the drivers, independent contractor status was seen as a benefit that freed them from 
direct supervision by supervisors and granted them the ability to work the hours they 
preferred (Newsham, 2000).  Under the Proposition K system, however, the seeds of the 
San Francisco taxi problem were planted.  Passengers suffered most from this system 
because there were no rules or regulations that explicitly required enough drivers to be 
available at any given time. Requests for drivers would be broadly transmitted across the 
city regardless of the driver's distance from a waiting passenger, or whether his or her 
taxicab was on-duty and unavailable. Also, drivers determined their schedules and could 
decide to end a shift and not accept a passenger's request. 
The flawed system introduced in 1978 with Proposition K deprived San 
Francisco's taxi patrons of reliable service for many decades.  Attempts at reform were 
often favored by medallion owners and taxicab companies instead of passengers. With 
this background, it is clear to see how DRS arrived in San Francisco and was 
immediately embraced by the public. The entrepreneurs behind the launches of DRS 
platforms in San Francisco were aware of the "taxi problem" and applied the new 
enabling technologies that brought improved service to the city.  It is worth noting, 
however, that the issue of independent contractor status has returned with the arrival of 
Uber, Lyft, and SideCar, (Wood, 2015). Recent developments involving DRS drivers will 
be examined in the section on the chronology of legal issues. The following section 
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summarizes legal and major transportation issues that affect the operation of DRS in San 
Francisco.  Following San Francisco, there will be a chronological review of DRS issues 
in New York. 
4.2.3 Chronology 
San Francisco Metro Transit Authority and the California Public Utilities 
Commission order UberCab to cease and desist, October, 2010.  Uber was launched 
in San Francisco in June 2010 under its original name, UberCab. The legal issue cited, a 
regulatory action initiated jointly by two government agencies is one of the earliest legal 
actions taken against the young company.  On October 19, 2010, UberCab received a 
cease and desist letter issued jointly by the San Francisco Transit Authority (SFMTA) 
and the California Public Utilities Commission.  An order of cease and desist is a legal 
document sent to an entity, in this case, a business, instructing them to stop allegedly 
unlawful activity and no to longer take up the activity again. A deadline usually 
accompanies the cease and desist document warning the company that failure to comply 
will result in a penalty, such as being sued (Legal Information Institute, 2015). The 
unlawful activity alleged was the operation of a taxi-like business without a license and 
not providing insurance equivalent to a commercial taxi's insurance (Kolodny, 2010). 
UberCab's chief executive at the time, Ryan Graves, responded to the legal 
document by saying that the company believes it is offering a service in compliance with 
the alluded to regulations.  UberCab contended that they were offering an innovative new 
form of transportation technology that the SFMTA and CPUC have not yet been able to 
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evaluate for the purposes of regulation.  Graves offered to educate the agencies to forge 
new sets of regulations based on the technology offered. Despite Graves' offer to educate, 
UberCab was still perceived by those outside the technology industry as a company that 
operates similarly to a taxicab cab, but without the required license and insurance 
(Siegler, 2010). It was during the time of this particular cease and desist letter that the 
company changed its name from UberCab to simply Uber to circumvent association with 
the traditional taxi industry (Kolodny, 2010) 
CPUC enters into operation agreement with Uber, December 2012. On December 12, 
2012, the CPUC issued a statement and said it would evaluate DRS services like Uber. 
The proceeding was intended to protect public safety and to encourage technological 
innovation in urban transportation (California Public Utilities Commission, 2013). This 
action by the state regulatory agency set in motion the eventual acceptance and regulation 
of DRS as a valid alternative transportation mode.  It was in 2013 that the CPUC would 
eventually draft rules that defined periods when a DRS service handled providing 
insurance and when a driver's insurance would take effect. This period would also lead to 
definitions regarding inspections of vehicles and background checks on drivers. With this 
initial agreement by the CPUC, cease and desist notices to Uber were suspended pending 
the outcome of the agency's rulemaking (California Public Utilities Commission, 2013a). 
Uber drivers file a class-action lawsuit alleging that Uber cheats them out of tips. 
August, 2013. Although there was a case settled in June of 2015 where a California 
judge determined that Uber drivers were employees of the company and not independent 
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contractors, in 2013 the independent contractor status of drivers was accepted as the 
relationship drivers had with a DRS platform .  Back then, as now, drivers depended on 
the DRS's app to collect fares and reimburse them minus the administrative fee that was 
typically 20% (Hubpages, 2014). The remaining 80% of the fare was deposited into a 
bank account designated by the driver.  Uber stated that tips to the driver were calculated 
into the fare so that passengers can simply use the phone app and avoid handling cash 
(Brustein, 2013). However, in the a class-action lawsuit filed in California in August, 
2013, drivers had alleged that Uber keeps prices artificially low as a way to compete with 
other platforms, thus depriving them of tip-income they would normally collect as 
traditional taxicab drivers. This lawsuit also alleged that Uber drivers are employees 
rather than independent contractors.  See also the heading "Uber Technologies v. Barbara 
Berwick, Jun 2015" where an Uber driver was successful in securing a ruling from the 
California Labor Commission stating that she was, in fact an employee of the company. 
The ruling in her favor required Uber to pay her for business expenses she during the two 
months she was a driver for Uber (Huet, 2015). 
CPUC established rules for DRS service and created a new regulatory category 
called Transportation Network Companies, September, 2013. DRS platforms were 
beginning to become ubiquitous by 2013. Uber, Lyft, and SideCar were expanding in 
cities across the United States.  Uber's expanded internationally with a 2011 launch in 
Paris, France. UberX was launched in 2012 in San Francisco and New York initially 
focusing on smaller hybrid cars.  UberX is a non-black car version of Uber specifically 
designed for competition with the other lower-cost rideshare platforms (Gannes, 2012). 
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Government regulators were often encountering situations with DRS services where no 
rulings existed due to the newness of the mode. 
  In San Francisco on September 19, 2013, California became the first U.S. state 
to regulate DRS services with a ruling issued by the CPUC (California Public Utilities 
Commission, 2013b). The regulatory model created by the CPUC has become a template 
emulated by many DRS services in other U.S. states. The ruling made DRS platforms 
such as UberX, Lyft, and SideCar subject to CPUC jurisdiction. As a result of the 
regulation, a new category for DRS platforms was created called Transportation Network 
Company (TNC). TNCs were defined as DRS services that used smartphones and 
Internet technology to match riders with drivers (California Public Utilities Commission, 
2013b). The CPUC  also set mandatory rules on driver and criminal background checks 
for drivers who register with a TNC.   
Much needed clarification on insurance was offered by the new CPUC rules. The 
regulatory body set three "defined periods" to help clarify when insurance applies Period 
One is  "App open-waiting for a match"; the driver is in his/her vehicle and turns on the 
app.  Period Two is "Match is accepted- but the passenger is not yet picked up"; the 
driver is on his/her way to retrieve the passenger.  Period Three is "Passenger in the 
vehicle and until the passenger safely exits vehicle". The CPUC wanted to ensure  
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Table 4.1: Summary of CPUC insurance regulations for TNCs (California Public 
Utilities Commission, 2013c). 
State of mobile device CPUC defined insurance coverage 
UberX Lyft SideCar 
Not logged 
on/ 
not available 
 app off Driver's personal auto insurance 
   
Logged on/ 
Not on trip 
Period 1 app on Driver's personal insurance, PLUS- 
Contingent liability coverage (also 
called "insurance gap" coverage (1) 
 
X X X 
Logged on/ 
driver accepts 
trip 
Periods 2 & 
3 
app on TNC must provide primary 
commercial insurance in the amount of 
one million dollars. This may be 
satisfied by TNC if: (a)commercial 
insurance is maintained by driver (2); 
(b) commercial insurance maintained 
by the TNC; or (c) a combination of 
(a) and (b)    
X X X 
Logged on/ 
during trip/ 
when trip ends 
Period 3 app on TNC must provide uninsured (UM) 
and underinsured (UIM) insurance in 
the amount of one million dollars. This 
may be satisfied by TNC if: 
(a)commercial insurance is maintained 
by driver (2); (b) commercial 
insurance maintained by the TNC; or 
(c) a combination of (a) and (b)    
X X X 
1. TNC provides contingent liability coverage if/when driver's personal auto insurer denies 
2. TNC must verify that the driver's insurance covers the vehicle for TNC purposes 
there were no insurance gaps when drivers were getting paid to give rides and achieved 
this with the new regulations (G. Mathieux, personal communication, October 9, 2014). 
Despite the legal acceptance of TNCs throughout California's cities and some 
jurisdictions throughout the United States, airports have stood vehemently opposed to 
TNC operations on airport property. Their hesitancy ostensibly stems from a concern 
about additional traffic congestion at airports. Some TNCs, such as Wingz, circumvent 
the airport issue since they do not use a smartphone app, but instead accept reservations 
for airport pickups and drop offs through their website only.  The CPUC and the City of 
San Francisco recognize that web-based companies such as Wingz historically had 
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customers reserve rides via the web. Thus, web-based platforms such as Wingz are 
exempt from the Period One and Period Two phases of insurance coverage.  However, 
web-based TNCs are required to provide coverage for defined Period Three. Defined 
period three is when the passenger enters the vehicle and until he/she safely exits (G. 
Mathieux, personal communication, October 6, 2014). Allowing TNCs to enter most U.S.  
airports is still being negotiated at the time of this writing. 
Family sues Uber for wrongful death, January, 2014. On December 31, 2013, a six-
year-old girl, Sofia Liu, was struck and killed by an UberX driver in a San Francisco 
crosswalk. In January, 2014, the girl's family filed a lawsuit against both the driver and 
Uber Technologies, the parent company of UberX (Levine, 2014). The lawsuit contended 
that the driver was logged on to the UberX app and was waiting to receive a ride request 
from a potential passenger. This allegation would place him in Period 1 of the CPUC's 
newly defined insurance requirements for TNCs.  According to the CPUC's definition of 
Period One, the TNC, in this case, UberX, would be required to provide insurance 
(Williams & Alexander, 2014).  The driver of the UberX vehicle has claimed that he had 
the app on and was waiting for a ride match.  However, Uber claims that the they are not 
liable because the driver was an independent contractor and not an employee.  Uber 
further claims that the driver was not carrying a fare or going to pick up a fare and had no 
reason for his smartphone app to be open (Williams, 2014).    
California regulators and the National Federation of the Blind investigate claims 
that DRS drivers refuse rides to passengers with service animals, May, 2014.  The 
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CPUC, the state regulatory body that acquired jurisdiction of DRS services as of 
September, 2013, and the SFMTA, the municipal agency with jurisdiction over the city's 
taxicabs, joined with the National Federation of the Blind to investigate claims that DRS 
drivers, and Uber in particular, were refusing rides to blind passengers with service 
animals.  A major problem for DRS services has been their avoidance of the issue of how 
to handle passengers who are disabled. Traditional carriers often point to this issue as an 
area where companies like Uber and Lyft are benignly excused by regulators from 
providing accommodation for passengers with special needs (Farr, 2014). Until this 
event, regulators had been lax in enforcing discrimination under the laws of the 
Americans with Disability Act of 1990 (ADA). This investigation would eventually lead 
to a lawsuit filed in May 2015. See heading " Disabled groups suing Uber and Lyft, May, 
2015" in this section.              
San Francisco's District Attorney's office files lawsuit against Uber, Lyft, and 
SideCar for alleged unlawful business practices, December, 2014. (unlawful business 
practices/background checks, illegal fees) The district attorneys of San Francisco and Los 
Angeles sued Uber over alleged unlawful business practices that included charging 
passengers a $4 fee that was meant to cover fees for passengers traveling to the airport.  
Other carriers charge a similar fee that is ultimately collected by the airport.  The lawsuit 
alleges that Uber has been charging the fee and pocketing it rather than forwarding it to 
the airport (Roberts, 2014). 
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In the lawsuit, Uber is also charged with being out of compliance with regards to 
performing adequate background checks on potential drivers.  By law, Uber cannot deny 
access to their platform by drivers who have been convicted  of a felony beyond seven 
years into the past (Macmillan, 2014)   Lyft reached a settlement with prosecutors and 
agreed to it would wait until the necessary permits and approvals were issued to resume 
picking up passengers at the airport (Lien & Mitchell, 2014). 
Some still buy San Francisco taxi medallions, January, 2015. While medallion prices 
fall nationally due to DRS services like UberX and Lyft, some still see the medallion as 
an investment that is worth buying at low prices. According to San Francisco cab driver, 
Gerard Rowland, medallion prices had fallen in the past when new transportation projects 
open, such as the BART urban rail system that began service in 1972. Medallion prices in 
San Francisco by the SFMTA. As in New York, medallions in San Francisco grant the 
owner the right to operate a taxicab either by themselves or by renting it to other drivers 
or taxicab companies (Said, 2015).            
Disabled groups were suing Uber and Lyft, May, 2015.  Uber and Lyft, the two major 
DRS services, were named as defendants in lawsuits filed in both California and Texas. 
The lawsuits illustrate the lack of training that DRS drivers received, especially with 
regards to regulatory issues such as being knowledgeable about the laws regarding ADA 
compliance.  The California lawsuit was brought by the National Federation of the Blind. 
The lawsuit describes an incident such as an UberX driver who placed a blind passenger's 
guide dog in the trunk of the vehicle. (Wieczer, 2015). Uber states that independent 
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contractors who drive for their platform can transport blind or other disabled passenger 
and that drivers who refuse such passengers are usually suspended.  Lyft offered a similar 
policy and added that drivers who refuse service animals must call a special hotline 
number and have a medically verified reason for refusal. Without medical 
documentation, Lyft's policy is similar in that refusal will result in suspension.  
Suspension in the case of DRS platforms means that the driver loses access to the app.  
The DRS services are careful to avoid wording that implies an employer/employee 
relationship with drivers.        
Uber's strategy to avoid discrimination accusations thus far has been its claim that 
it is merely a technology company that matches independent contractors with potential 
customers.  Thus, Uber claims that as a technology company it is not bound to abide by 
the same laws that are intended to regulate other providers of transportation services 
(Wieczer, 2015).     
California Labor Commission rules Uber drivers are employees, June, 2015. A 
major event in the early life of DRS services occurred on June 16, 2015 when a ruling by 
a judge for the California Labor Commission said that an Uber driver should be classified 
as an employee of the company, and not as an independent contractor (Issac & Singer, 
2015). The implications of this decision will possibly determine the future direction of 
the sharing economy. 
DRS is a significant part of the so-called sharing economy. The sharing economy 
is a system of collaborative consumption where parties share services in real time using 
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enabling technologies such as the Internet and mobile communication devices with global 
positioning system (GPS) technology making them location aware (Botsman & Rogers, 
2010). The business model for the sharing economy relies on technology companies with 
low overhead that can match parties who are either seeking to sell or seeking to receive, 
services.  Thus, technology companies could be looked at as "platforms" facilitating 
transactions with limited or no need for a large physical plant or large staff of employees. 
Some parts of the sharing economy require traditional elements.  For example, for-profit 
companies like Zipcar, a division of Avis Rentals, relies on enabling technologies such as 
smartphones and the Internet to allow customers to book cars (Figure 4.2).  However, 
Zipcar requires an inventory of vehicles and a physical place to park them.  Employees 
are needed to attend to both the inventory and physical facility that stores the vehicles 
while not in use (Sundararajan, 2013). DRS services such as Uber, Lyft, and SideCar, 
have thus far remained free of the constraints of inventory and physical plant because 
they rely on independent contractors who provide their private vehicles. 
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Figure 4.2: Unlike DRS services such as Uber 
and Lyft, car sharing companies maintain and 
fleet and a facility to store vehicles (Source: 
John DiGianni) 
 
The California Labor Commission decision in San Francisco, however, could 
have major consequences for DRS services who relied on drivers offering their services 
as independent contractors. Uber contends that the ruling's scope was limited to the 
person who files the case (Moore, 2015). If the ruling sets a broad precedent, DRS 
services would have to pay benefits to employees such as health care and payroll taxes. A 
sharing economy under this scenario would not differ greatly from the 
employer/employee economy of the past century.     
4.3 New York 
4.3.1 Introduction 
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New York was chosen for comparison due to its long history of livery vehicles 
and the regulation of that industry.  Early for-hire electric vehicles began arriving on the 
streets of New York by the end of the nineteenth century. As with today's technology that 
has become associated with DRS, early automobiles were the cutting-edge technology of 
that time in history.  They were often too expensive for the average individual to 
purchase.  Hence, early taxicab companies were often fleets owned by entrepreneurs who 
knew where to locate the best vehicles, and how to secure the financing to purchase them, 
much like today's start-ups from the Silicon Valley.  
In 1907, New York businessman Harry N. Allen was inspired to create one of the 
city's earliest fleets.  Allen was reacting to the high prices charged by independent drivers 
in what he called "vehicular extortion" (Hodges, 2007).  The solution, according to Allen, 
was to start a company that would offer superior service compared with the status quo of 
the day. A clean and modern fleet would appeal to passengers and become a popular 
alternative. He purchases a fleet of sixty-five French manufacturer Darracq cabs that 
were equipped with fare meters.  Drivers wore matching uniforms.  Allen's experiment 
created a valuable service with a corporate identity. Ultimately, his New York Taxicab 
Company was successful and prospered. Hence, taxicabs became the new standard for 
transportation in the City of New York (Hodges, 2007).  
The historical context was provided to illustrate parallels with the development of 
DRS today in San Francisco. Disruptive innovation in the transportation industry had 
taken place more than one hundred years ago in New York. As the city entered the period 
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after World War I, its social atmosphere intensified as events such as the Jazz Age and 
Prohibition collided (Hodges, 2007). In 1904, the city's new subway opened, three years 
before Harry N. Allen's New York Taxicab Company. What was good for working 
people, however, would not suffice for the nightlife of Manhattan. New York's social 
nightlife in the 1920s saw the taxicab become a standard mode of urban transportation.  
During this time, fleets were organized to the degree that they had an industry-dedicated  
magazine. Cab News was an example of a magazine published by the fleet owners that 
was used to promote their companies.  The magazine was also used to mold an image of 
the industry favorable to the fleet owners. News articles would paint an unflattering 
picture of independent taxicab owner-operators as coarse individuals unworthy of 
patronage (Hodges, 2007). This tactic is similar to the one used presently by Uber and 
Lyft today who portray their drivers as clean-cut citizens owning well maintained late 
model vehicle.  
4.3.2 Background 
      In New York, privately owned fleets lease yellow taxi medallion vehicles to 
drivers. A medallion is a small metal plate with information inscribed such as a serial 
number, attached to the vehicle's hood. Medallions are sold by the city's Taxi and 
Limousine Commission, a municipal regulatory body that has jurisdiction over all the 
FHVs. The medallion allows the vehicles to be regulated and used as a for-hire livery 
conveyance. Medallions were created in New York in 1937 under the Haas Act, signed 
into law by then-Mayor Fiorello H. La Guardia.  The Act was partially in response to a 
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condition caused by the Great Depression when thousands of unregulated vehicles filled 
Manhattan streets with men trying to earn a living.   
Traditional taxis and limousines are temporarily leased to drivers who use the vehicle for 
a specified shift, after which the vehicle is leased again at the end of his or her work shift 
to the next driver who repeats the process.  Thus, it is often the case that a New York 
medallion cab is driven continuously for several or more 24-hour periods. The average 
yellow New York medallion cab is driven 180 miles per shift. The New York yellow taxi 
fleet can provide approximately 485,000 trips per day, most with an average trip distance 
of 2.6 miles. Yellow taxi activity is primarily in Manhattan and accounts for 90.3% of all 
pick-ups (Table 4.2) (New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission, 2014).  
Table 4.2: Yellow taxi activity in New York, 2014. 
Borough Percent of all Taxi Pick-ups 
Manhattan 90.3% 
Bronx 0.9% 
Brooklyn 3.1% 
Queens 1.5% 
Staten Island 0.8% 
All Airports (JFK and LGA) 3.5% 
New York City 100.0% 
Source: New York Taxi and Limousine Commission, 2014 Taxicab Fact Book (2014) 
 
On the other hand, DRS drivers are owner-operators. Hence, their vehicles sit idle 
when not in use.  From a monetary perspective there is more efficient use of the 
traditional taxicab, however, from an environmental view, the vehicle's gasoline or diesel 
engine continuously operates, thus contributing to anthropogenically induced 
atmospheric GHGs.  The operation of DRS vehicles is sometimes optimized by owners 
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who will "share" the use of the vehicle with other drivers during hours when their non-
working hours.   
Uber and other apps have allegedly filled a need, especially in areas where taxi 
service was difficult to summon, mainly due to the nature of how they are regulated. 
"Most" jurisdictions issue the medallions and place limits on how many there can per 
year.  Thus, if a city sets a medallion limit of 1,500, then only 1,500 taxis can operate.  
Uber can dispatch as many cars as the system can handle at any one time.  As of  March 
2015, there were more Uber vehicles operating in New York than yellow medallion 
taxicabs. According the current TLC Commission Meera Joshi, there were 14,088 Uber 
vehicles operating compared to 13,587taxis. (Pramuk, 2015). The following section is a 
chronology of legal events, many regulatory that occurred in New York with the arrival 
of DRS. 
4.3.3 Chronology 
Two taxi medallions fetch a price of $1 million each, October, 2011. Prior to the 
arrival of Uber in New York, two taxi medallions sold for $1 million each.  The price was 
highest recorded sale in the city's history since the medallion system began in 1937. Back 
then, the historical cost of a medallion was $10 (Grynbaum, 2011). This story is 
significant because it occurs in the same month and year Uber was launched in New 
York. DRS services such as Uber have made a direct impact on the medallion according 
to research produced at HVM Capital, LLC, a hedge fund that publishes research on the 
taxicab medallion industry (Badger, 2014).  Medallion prices in many U.S. have fallen as 
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DRS services continue to make inroads and replace traditional taxicabs (Hickman, 2015). 
In Chicago, for example, medallion prices have dropped from a high of $375,000 in April 
2014 to $150,000 by December 2014. Although the price fluctuation of medallions is not 
a legal event, some medallions owners have sought to sue municipalities for value lost in 
their medallions based on the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution (PR Newswire, 2015). 
New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC) does not authorize the use 
of smartphones for cab-hailing apps, September, 2012.   David S. Yassky, chairman of 
the TLC, issues a statement saying that smartphone apps will not be allowed until 
contracts with payment  
UberTaxi pulls out of New York due to legal questions about whether its app 
violated TLC guidelines, October, 2012.  While passenger demand for the smartphone 
app was high according to Uber's chief executive Travis Kalanick, drivers dropped out of 
the program due to fears of reprisal from the TLC (Flegenheimer, 2012b). Mr. Kalanick 
wrote on his blog that the TLC had tried to "squash the effort" (Kalanick, 2012). 
New York Department of Financial Services orders SideCar and RelayRides to 
cease and desist, May, 2013.  Shortly after SideCar, the smallest of the major DRSs, was 
launched in New York in March 2013, the New York Department of Financial Services 
ordered that they and RelayRides, a peer-to-peer car-sharing3 service, cease and desist. In 
                                                          
3 The concept of short-term car rentals begins in 1948 in Switzerland where car ownership was prohibitive 
during the post-war recovery period. Early programs in Europe starting in 1971 in France with "Procotip"; 
"Witkar" in Netherlands, 1973; "Green Cars" in U.K. late 1970s'; and "Vivalla Bil" in Sweden, 1983.     
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the case of RelayRides, its chief executive officer, Ander Haddad, commented on his 
blog that the company was suspending all service in the state because the New York 
Department of Financial Services alleged that the company was not complying with 
unique aspects of New York insurance law (Chernova, 2013). The New York  
Department of Financial Services is the state's regulatory agency that supervises all 
insurance companies that do business in the state.  
TLC deputy commissioner joins Uber, May, 2014.  An indication of where DRS is 
going can be seen in the TLC deputy commissioner's departure and new employment by 
Uber Technologies.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
In the United States, Purdue University conducted research on car sharing from 1983 to 1986. The Short 
Term Auto Rental (STAR) was established in San Francisco by a private company and ran from 1983 to 
1985.  
A common thread among these early programs is their quick failure rate usually attributed to poor planning.  
Of the previously mentioned programs, only STAR based in San Francisco had positive results from the 
consumer's perspective (Transportation Cooperative Research Program, 2005).   
Car sharing in its current  iteration has roots in Switzerland and Germany  with programs dating to the late 
1980s.  Mobility Switzerland in 1987 is the first sizeable car sharing company based on the present model. 
Mobility Switzerland  is still a leading car share program in Europe.  Statt Auto Berlin followed one year 
later in 1988. Shortly afterward car sharing programs began to proliferate throughout Europe. By 2004, 
there were 70,000 cars sharing members in Germany and 60,000 in Switzerland (Transportation 
Cooperative Research Program, 2005).       
By 1994, the concept of car sharing arrived in North America n Quebec City with Auto-Com, which later 
became Communauto. In the United States, the first large-scale program, CarSharing Portland, grew 
rapidly from its beginning in 1998. As of 2008 there were 14 active car sharing programs in Canada and 19 
in the United States.  By 2009, there were approximately 319,000 cars sharing members with 7,500 
vehicles available to them in North America. The four largest providers serve 99% and 95.2% of the 
membership, respectively in the United States and Canada (Shaheen, et al., 2009). 
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Lyft plans launch in Brooklyn and Queens and is halted by TLC, July, 2014.  DRS 
service Lyft planned to enter New York via the outer boroughs of Brooklyn and Queens. 
It's launch date was set for Friday, July 11th.  Days before the launch, the TLC sent out a 
notice warning drivers that Lyft was not yet approved by the commission. The 
commission's primary concern was city-licensed drivers working for Lyft as an 
alternative (Huet, 2014).  For taxicab drivers, the move between DRS services and 
traditional taxis is often fluid.  Many do not see one service as "better" or "worse" than 
the other, but "different" in how the service can fulfill his or her needs at the moment.   
Lyft reaches a complex deal with TLC to launch service in New York, July, 2015. 
Two weeks after its anticipated launch in Brooklyn and Queens,  Lyft received 
permission from the TLC to launch in all five boroughs of the city.  The stipulation, 
however, was that all drivers had to be city-licensed by the TLC  This varies from the 
Lyft business model that depended on private individuals who could enter and leave the 
Lyft platform without any regulatory requirements.  Hence, New York City differs from 
the San Francisco model where the state CPUC created a separate class for app-based 
transportation, the TNC (Lawler, 2014). As of July, 2015, the TLC licensing requirement 
along with a require that the vehicle have TLC license plates is still in effect (Lyft, 2015). 
A Crash victim filed a lawsuit against driver and Uber, March, 2015. Erin Sauchelli, 
a pedestrian seriously injured while in a crosswalk in Manhattan, filed a lawsuit against 
Uber and the driver of the vehicle.  Sauchelli's claim is that the Uber driver was distracted 
by his app, a violation of New York State law.  Sauchelli was walking in the crosswalk 
with her boyfriend, Wesley Manning, who died at the scene.  Unlike the wrongful death 
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lawsuit of Sofia Liu in San Francisco, the driver was temporarily suspended and then 
reinstated by Uber.  The driver's TLC license was also suspended and reinstated (Aaron, 
2015). 
TLC proposes rules that would strengthen regulation of car-hailing apps like Uber 
and Lyft, May, 2015.  The TLC proposed new rules aimed at DRS services. The 
regulatory agency's rules package included apps that will lock while vehicles are in 
motion, requiring estimates of fares during surge pricing4. 
4.4 Compare and Contrast 
The following section compares and contrasts the chronologies of the legal and 
administrative events that were recorded for San Francisco and New York. The 
similarities and differences are presented to shed light on how DRS has evolved in two of 
its most critical markets.     
DRS status. The study reveals the difference in the status of DRS services in both cities.  
Although the companies are the same, the rules they must navigate are different and 
depend largely on the regulatory body whose jurisdiction they fall under.  In the case of 
San Francisco, DRS services benefit from their status as TNCs, a category created by the 
CPUC, the state regulatory body with jurisdiction over passenger transportation 
companies (California Public Utilities Commission, 2013b).  A difference can also be 
                                                          
4 Surge Pricing is when rates increase based on demand.  On their website, Uber explains the increase is to 
ensure that there are enough drivers on the road during peak periods (e.g. sporting events, weather related, 
holidays, etc.).  Lyft has a similar policy called Prime Time. Both companies have faced criticism for this 
policy, yet they defends using Surge Pricing and Prime Time stating that it puts more cars on the road 
during the busiest periods (Davidson, 2015).     
133 
 
 
 
noted in that the CPUC initially explored whether DRS services fell under its scope of 
influence, unlike the New York TLC.  TNC status preserves the intended nature of DRS, 
which is ride sharing accessible to drivers who want to be matched with riders without 
the need for livery licensing.  However, in June, 2015, a judge for the California Labor 
Commission ruled in favor of a driver in a case where Uber is required to compensate her 
as an employee rather than an independent contractor (Huet, 2015).  This ruling has 
ramifications not only for California DRS drivers but may also be seen as a precedent 
that other state labor commissions will follow.  Many states have used the CPUC 
category of TNC as a precedent to follow.     Indents should just be ½ inch 
 In New York, DRS services are influenced by the TLC.  The regulatory body has 
jurisdiction over all FHVs that operate in the city.  Early on, the TLC was successful in 
requiring Uber to follow city-licensing rules.  Thus, companies like Uber, and more 
recently Lyft, must access a pool of licensed TLC drivers.  The drivers vehicles must also 
carry TLC License plates (Lawler, 2014). This policy is unlike DRS services in San 
Francisco where DRS drivers do not have to be licensed livery drivers.  
Wrongful Death. Sofia Liu's death calls into question the structure of the insurance rules 
created by the CPUC (Table 4.1).  Uber has managed thus far to fight the rules 
established in September, 2013 by the CPUC (California Public Utilities Commission, 
2013c).  The San Francisco case differs from the New York case in that although the 
driver admits to using the Uber app at the time of the accident, Uber has been successful 
in its argument that the driver was not performing Uber business, but using the GPS 
134 
 
 
 
function of the app. Also, Uber contends in the San Francisco case that the driver is not 
an employee, but an Uber software licensee.  Uber also contends that the driver was not 
carrying a passenger, or on his way to pick up a fare at the time of the crash (Williams, 
2014).In NYC, the plaintiff is using the state's law against distracted driving, and also the 
TLC's rule against using an electronic device while driving (Aaron, 2015). 
Medallions. In San Francisco, medallions remain stable as the SFMTA sets the price 
(Said, 2015).  In New York, the medallion are treated as an investment instrument and are 
tied to financial markets that set the price based on demand.  Medallion transactions are 
often handled by financial companies, such as Medallion Financial, a lender who handles 
medallion sales (Grynbaum, 2011). 
Cease and Desist orders.  In San Francisco, the large DRS service are often positioned 
well to legally challenge cease and desist order. In New York,  cease and desist orders are 
effective for smaller companies that lack resources to mount a legal battle, such as in the 
cases involving SideCar and RelayRides (Chernova, 2013).  The process for large 
companies in New York, such as Uber and Lyft,  is different.  In the case of New York, 
the regulatory body, the TLC, exercises much control directly over the licensed drivers.  
It is common, therefore, as in the case of the Lyft launch in 2014, for the TLC to issue 
warnings to drivers that discourage them from working for the DRS service.  The 
warnings can be interpreted as threats to losing one's license.  Since DRS services must 
choose a city-licensed driver, the pool of available drivers becomes too small. Hence, the 
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DRS is forced to exit the market or capitulate to the demands of the TLC if they want to 
conduct business in New York (Lawler, 2014).  
4.5 Conclusion   
Comparing and contrasting the city case histories chronologically was insightful to 
instruct how DRS is evolving in two of the more influential markets in the nation.  In San 
Francisco, were modern ICT-enabled DRS began, there were ten events chronologically 
recorded from 2010 to 2015.  In New York, where regulation of the traditional taxi 
industry began in 1937 with the Haas Act, there were nine events recorded.   
In summary, events in San Francisco have moved quickly beginning with early 
establishment of the major companies, i.e. Uber and Lyft, and early regulation and 
defining of the DRS business model with the CPUC ruling on TNCs in 2013. The CPUC 
ruling has also moved quickly to establish insurance rules for DRS services that have 
been emulated in other U.S. cities. DRS in San Francisco has appeared to catch opposing 
stakeholders off-guard and is on track laying the groundwork for this new transportation 
service that is being launched in other states and municipalities.  
Challenges such as the wrongful death of a pedestrian in the January 2014 lawsuit 
pose more of a minor financial threat than one that is existential.  With a valuation of 
approximately $50 billion as of May, 2015, Uber is poised to be the world's most 
valuable private start-up company, exceeding older established transportation companies 
such as FedEx, last valued at $45 billion, and  at Nissan Motor, with a capitalization of 
$47 billion (Tam & de la Merced, 2015)         
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TNCs have encountered an obstruction in San Francisco, however, with the recent 
ruling by a California Labor Commission judge (Issac & Singer, 2015). The ruling states 
that Uber's drivers are not independent contractors, but instead are employees of the 
company based on how the company oversees the screening of drivers and setting of  
prices for rides.  Uber contends that the decision only applies to the single individual 
name in the lawsuit (Wood, 2015). The legal chronology of this review ends with this 
latest major event and is significant since the outcome will dictate whether the DRS 
model will be encumbered with employees, a facet of earlier ridesharing models that 
required elements of traditional businesses such as Zipcar (Sundararajan, 2013).  
In New York, penetration of the urban transportation market has moved quickly 
despite regulation by the city's TLC.  The regulatory agency was quick to claim 
jurisdiction over DRS services and used modifications to existing rules to incorporate 
city-licensed drivers into the disruption of the medallion-based taxicab industry.  The 
New York yellow taxi medallion hit a historic high of $1.3 million in April 2013 and has 
dropped in value to approximately $840,000 as of March 2015 (Caruthers, 2015).    
Hence, in New York, DRS has adapted to the existing regulatory environment at 
the expense of the medallion. system.  In the case of New York, more research will be 
required to determine the ramifications of a collapse of the medallion system and which 
parties stand to benefit from such change.                     
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions and recommendations 
5. Introduction 
The research set out to explore the current state and directions of dynamic 
ridesharing (DRS), specifically within the United States. DRS can be traced back to the 
early car sharing clubs of World War II, and ultimately to present-day Internet-enabled 
and location-aware DRS.  Earlier iterations of ridesharing were usually an employer or 
government sponsored endeavors.  The organizational involvement of employers and 
government agencies were necessary to initiate matches between drivers and riders. As 
ridesharing progressed, telecommunications were used in conjunction with early Internet 
technology to deliver reliable matching of drivers and riders (Saddiqi & Buliung, 2013). 
With the wide public acceptance of smartphones and social media websites such as 
Facebook and Twitter, ridesharing had the final components necessary to allow real-time 
matching (Amey, Attanucci, & Mishalani, 2011).  
Chapter 2 gave the history of DRS as it relates to its previous iterations, i.e. 
carpools, and ridesharing.  The review states what is new about DRS, which is mainly, its 
departure from the traditional disciplines of transportation engineering and planning. 
Both disciplines have had primary roles in applying Transportation Demand Management 
strategies to reduce single-occupant vehicle use by shifting drivers to high-occupancy 
modes such as carpooling and mass transit (Black & Schreffler, 2010).      
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The research revealed what is happening in a selection of cities where this 
emerging innovation is being allowed to play itself out.  For example, in San Francisco, 
the origination point of DRS, regulators were comparatively quick to set mandatory rules  
regarding how driver records, criminal background checks, vehicle safety inspections, 
and insurance issues were to be addressed.  The California Public Utilities Commission 
(CPUC) became the state agency with jurisdiction over the newly created Transportation 
Network Companies (TNCs), the name used to describe DRS platforms that used 
smartphones and Internet technology to match riders with drivers (California Public 
Utilities Commission, 2013).  In New York, the birthplace of the medallion system,, there 
are now more Uber vehicles than yellow taxis according to the city's Taxi and Limousine 
Commission, the municipal agency charged with jurisdiction over all for-hire-vehicles 
(FHVs) (Pramuk, 2015).  A Chapter 4 review of these two premier cities revealed that 
establishment of the major DRS platforms, Uber, Lyft, and SideCar, has been fraught 
with legal issues that threaten their continued operation. Examination of the two cities 
also revealed who is involved in this new form of urban transportation.  Aside from the 
primary stakeholders, i.e. the DRS platforms' management, regulatory agencies, and taxi 
and limousine labor groups, a large part of the driving force has been broad consumer 
acceptance of the enabling technologies that make real-time ridesharing possible.     
Chapter 3 examined who are the users of DRS.  A summary of the national survey 
of 306 respondents shows striking homogeneity among the users who were riders. They 
are predominately White, college educated, and from households with high incomes.  
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Recommendations based on these findings indicate further research needed to determine 
the implications that this elite group has on the future direction of urban transportation.   
5.1 Limitations of the study  
The study opens the view of the challenge of urban transportation that is 
continuous. Urban transportation has been evolving in the American city through much 
of the Industrial Age. As cities grow, the challenge becomes more complex. An 
indication of the complexity is the study's singular focus on transportation.  It does not 
address other urban systems such as water, energy, and waste disposal.   
Based on the research presented, change is coming to transportation, yet no one 
can yet predict how to manage the change. For example, in the case of Uber, Lyft, and 
SideCar drivers are independent contractors who set their work hours based on personal 
preference. The status of the independent contractor is fraught with legal ramifications 
that are presently being played out in the U.S. courts (Wood, 2015). As cities grow and 
become centers of activity without restriction to time-of-day, the independent contractor 
nature of DRS will present challenges to populations that will require transportation 
during non-peak hours.  Already, monetary restrictions on the operation of public 
transportation systems reduce access during a period of low ridership.  
Limitations of the study also do not answer why DRS is spreading rapidly from 
one city to the next and displacing traditional urban fixtures such as taxicabs. The study 
offered only what is happening in cities and who is involved.    
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5.2 Recommendations 
 This DRS study was an introduction to a technology that is used by a cross-
section of the urban population that uses a public service that is privately financed.  In its 
present state, the technology is used by individuals who have the financial means to pay 
for the service. This has been confirmed by the survey in Chapter 3 of the study.  The 
survey points to a national sample of individuals who can use DRS.  The use of DRS by 
this elite group is based on their self-interest.  Their elite status is defined primarily by 
the survey's responses that show users who are highly educated, i.e. graduate school 
level, and earning incomes above $200,000 per household. This self-interest by this 
group is in direct conflict with the larger public who do not have the means to use DRS 
because they are handicapped by lower incomes.   
 Lower income groups, however, are not totally removed from participation in the 
new technology.  They are often the drivers of vehicles who are earning income through 
registration with DRS platforms. Participation by lower income users may be short-lived 
as further advancements in technology continue and contribute to the convergence of the 
automobile and information technology industries.  
    Like elevator operators of the past century, FHV drivers may become 
anachronistic with continued advancements in driverless technology.  Presently, Uber is 
partnering with Google and Carnegie Mellon University to work on mapping technology, 
safety, and autonomous vehicles. A partnership of Uber and Carnegie Mellon University 
call the Advanced Technologies Center was announced in February 2015 (Uber, 2015).  
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The partnership, based in Pittsburgh, will focus primarily on the development of an Uber 
vehicle that will pickup and drop off passengers autonomously. The ramifications of 
driverless vehicle technology are enormous and will impact not only transportation but 
labor, as well as more human-based employment, is lost to the roboticization of the 
economy (Winker & Macmillan, 2015).      
Recommendation for future research is also made based on the pilot study of 
Chapter 4 that looked at the two premier cities, San Francisco and New York.  The pilot 
study used legal and administrative reports to examine how DRS works in two large 
cities. Further research is needed to investigate how the DRS process repeats itself in 
cities of 100,000 with an exponential increase to 1 million. The research would be based 
on Raymond Murphy's study of the American central business district that was an urban 
geography study that attempted to delimit the physical boundaries of the city's downtown 
(Murphy, 1973).  By delimitation of the boundaries within which DRS is successful it is 
hoped that a metric could be developed for determining where to use the service. The 
metric determining boundary delimitations could have application in establishing whether 
DRS works everywhere, and especially if it works in smaller cities. 
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APPENDIX B 
Raw Data From DRS Survey
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APPENDIX C 
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